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THE SECOND CIRCUITS IMPOSITION OF
LITIGATION-ENDING SANCTIONS FOR FAILURES
TO COMPLY WITH DISCOVERY ORDERS: SHOULD
RULE 37(b)(2) DEFAULTS AND DISMISSALS BE
DETERMINED BY A ROLL OF THE DICE?
INTRODUCTION
Federal courts across the nation have become less hesitant
to impose severe sanctions on parties who fail to comply with
discovery orders.1 For example, in June of 1995, the Second
Circuit affirmed a $280,000 default judgment against a litigant
for failure to comply with a discovery order.2 The default judg-
ment was entered in accordance with the provisions of Rule
37(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.3 Rule 37(b)(2)
I Numerous articles can be found in recent years regarding harsh sanctions
being levied for discovery abuse. See, ag., Comment, Hinkde v. Sam Blanken &
Co.: Dismissals for Discouery Abuse--Toward a New Standard in the District of
Columbia, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 761, 767-68 (1987) (discussing the deterrent stan-
dard for discovery abuse endorsed by the Supreme Court in National Hocley
League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., and its positive effect of decreasing a
courts reluctance to impose the "ultimate sanction" of dismissal). For a discussion
regarding National Hockey, see infra pp. 594-96 and accompanying notes; Deborah
Pines, Default Judgments Entered Due to Discovery Abuse, N.Y. LJ., Nov. 10,
1993, at 1; Henry J. Reske, Rare Sanction Against Firm, Client: Judge Enters
Default Judgment says ABC and Wilmer, Cutler Suppresscd Facts, A.BA. J., July
1992, at 23 (discussing case in Washington, D.C. where federal judge ended a race
discrimination suit filed by a prestigious firm with a default judgment); Georgia
Sargeant, Landmark Court Sanction May Herald New Era in Pre- Wal Di cery,
TRIAL, Apr. 1994, at 89; Gary Spencer, Dismissal Affirmed for Discouery Abuse,
N.Y. L.J., Nov. 2, 1994, at 1; see also Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1271
(2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987) (Even though the subject of sanc-
tions is a distasteful one for any court, increasing tensions in and occasional abus-
es of the judicial system have prompted both judges and legislators to turn toward
sanctions as a means of improving the litigation process.").
2 Bambu Sales, Inc. v. Ozak Trading Inc., 58 F.3d 849 (2d Cir. 1995).
s Rule 37(b)(2) authorizes a district court to sanction a party for failure to
comply with an order. It reads:
If a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a per-
son designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a par-
ty fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including an
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authorizes courts to make orders regarding discovery failures
"as are just,' and provides examples of the sanctions a court
may impose for failure to comply with a discovery order. For
instance, a court may issue an order that establishes facts ad-
verse to a disobedient party,' precludes certain evidence or
designated claims and defenses, strikes pleadings7 stays pro-
ceedings,' dismisses a party's action,' or enters default judg-
ment against a party.0 A court may also treat the failure to
obey a discovery order as contempt of court."
order made under subdivision (a) of this rule or Rule 35, or if a party
fails to obey an order entered under Rule 26(f), the court in which the
action is pending may make such orders in regard to the failure as are
just, and among others the following.
(A) An order that the matters regarding which the order was made
or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the
purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtain-
ing the order;
(B) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or
oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting that party from
introducing designated matters in evidence;
(C) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying fur-
ther proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or
proceeding or any party thereof, or rendering a judgment by default
against the disobedient party;
(D) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an
order treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey any orders ex-
cept an order to submit to a physical or mental examination;
(E) Where a party has failed to comply with an order under Rule
35(a) requiring that party to produce another for examination, such or-
ders as are listed in paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of this subdivision,
unless the party failing to comply shows that that party is unable to
produce such person for examination.
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the
court shall require the party failing to obey the order or the attorney
advising that party or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including
attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the
failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an
award of expenses unjust.
FED. R. CIrV. P. 37(b)(2).
4Id.
5 FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A).
6 FED. R. CIv. P. 37(b)(2)(B).
7 FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C).
8Id.
9Id.
10 Id.
" FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(D).
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Rule 37(b)(2)'s authorization to render default judgments
for failure to comply with discovery orders is extreme.' Nev-
ertheless, by affirming a default judgment in Bambu Sales,
Inc. v. Ozak Trading Co., the Second Circuit emphasized its
policy that discovery orders are meant to be followed and that
such "potent medicine" 3 is appropriate against a party who
"flouts such orders."4 Unfortunately, the Bambu decision does
little to provide concrete guidance to either litigants or courts
as to what circumstances warrant the "extreme measure" of
default judgment rather than other, less drastic sanctions.
Depriving a litigant of the opportunity to have a case de-
cided on the merits instinctively offends one's sense of fairness
and justice if the deprivation is not clearly deserved. In fact,
close examination of the Bambu case and prior Second Circuit
case law suggests that perhaps the result was wrong. Because
the Second Circuit has no articulated test by which to judge
degrees of discovery abuse, 5 it is difficult to ascertain wheth-
er Bambu warranted the extreme result affirmed in the case.
The Bambu opinion fails to address the policy implications
involved when a court chooses to impose a litigation-ending
sanction on what it deems a contumacious party. Moreover, the
case departs from other cases in the Second Circuit because
the Bambu default judgment was entered without any warning
and without any specified deadline for compliance.'"
'1 Bambu Sales, Inc. v. Ozak Trading Inc., 58 F.3d 849, 853 (2d Cir. 1995).
' Id.
14 Id. (citation omitted).
15 See, e.g., Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1271 (2d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987) ("Unfortunately, however, we do not yet have an inte-
grated 'code! of sanctions to supply coherent guidance.").
"6 See infra notes 207-08, 233 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
role that prior warnings have played in Second Circuit litigation-ending sanction
cases. Interestingly, Bambu was cited in a November 1995 Southern District of
New York opinion as support for a Rule 37(d) dismissal based on discovery fail-
ures by the plaintiff in the case. EI-Yafi v. 360 East 72nd Owners Corp., 164
F.RD. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). The magistrate judge's report and recommendation in
the case noted that "[tihe fact pattern here is quite similar to that in Bambu,"
because the recusant party had adequate notice that failure to comply with the
second official discovery order 'could result in default judgment.
This mischaracterizes the Bambu case in two major aspects: 1) The recusant
defendants in Bambu were not explicitly notified that failure to comply with the
discovery order at issue could result in default, see infra pp. 636-37 and accompa-
nying notes; and (2) The default entered against the defendants in Bambu was the
result of failure to comply with a single discovery order, not two orders as was
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Several other circuits, unlike the Second Circuit, have
articulated specific factors that district courts must consider
before imposing litigation-ending sanctions upon litigants who
fail to comply with discovery orders. 7 Not all circuits, howev-
er, have adopted such a method, and no one test is applied
universally. This lack of uniformity is troublesome and merits
attention because only in extreme situations should a litigant
be denied the opportunity to have a case heard on its merits
due to a procedural violation. Considering the circuits' different
policies, contumacious conduct warranting a severe sanction in
one circuit court may not lead to the same result in another.
However, within any particular circuit similar conduct should
ideally lead to similar results. At a minimum, there ought to
be consistency in the application of harsh sanctions in any
given circuit. Otherwise, sanction imposition has the potential
to be arbitrary and unfair.
This Note explores the Second Circuit's approach to litiga-
tion-ending sanctions with a particular focus on the recent
Bambu decision. Bambu both epitomizes the problems in this
area and represents a dramatic departure from other, less
recent Second Circuit decisions. Part I provides the historical
background of Rule 37(b)(2) sanctions and discusses Supreme
Court precedents that have influenced the various approaches
to imposing litigation-ending sanctions. Part II reviews the
approaches of other circuits. Particular emphasis is placed on
those circuits with clear standards regarding the propriety of
imposing litigation-ending sanctions for failures to comply with
discovery orders. Part III explores the history of litigation-
ending sanctions in the Second Circuit leading up to its deci-
sion in Bambu. Part IV then examines the Bambu decision in
detail, and Part V discusses the case in light of the Second
Circuit's approach in general. This detailed analysis both high-
lights Bambu's shortcomings and demonstrates that the sanc-
tion imposed in the case may have been too harsh. Finally,
Part VI proposes a rule that, if adopted by the Second Circuit,
the case in EI-Yafi. See infra Parts IVA and M.B detailing the course of events
in Bambu which led to the entry of default judgment based on the violation of a
single discovery order.
17 See infra notes 103-108 for cases enumerating the explicit tests applied by
the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits. The Federal Circuit and
the D.C. Circuit are not included in this Note's discussion and analysis.
[Vol. 62:5685
1996] LITIGATION-ENDING SANCTIONS FOR DISCOVERYABUSE 589
would provide greater clarity for judges and litigants, and
would better serve the underlying purpose of sanction imposi-
tion. The proposal suggests an approach that balances judicial
discretion in this sensitive area with greater certainty and
consistency. Both the bench and trial practitioners recognize
the need to impose more severe sanctions more often for dis-
covery abuse. 8 A less discretionary rule or approach will ac-
tually strengthen a court's ability to impose harsh sanctions
and therefore advance the goals behind imposing discovery
sanctions.'
" See, eg., Mark S. Cady, Curbing Litigation Abuse and Misuse: A Judicial
Approach, 36 DRAKE L. REV. 483, 484-85, 518 (1986-87) (stating that public per-
ception of legal system is at a low ebb" and that judges must eliminate abuse by
imposing sanctions and shifting responsibility for costs and fees); Barbara J.
Gorham, Fisons: Will It Tame the Beast of Discovery Abuse?, 69 WASI. L REV.
765 (1994) (exploring Washington Supreme Court case affirming dismissal for dis-
covery abuse against what the author describes as 'the backdrop of the historic
failure of courts to impose adequate sanctions for discovery abuse); Carol W.
Hunstein, The Decline of Professionalism-Bar Versus Bench Responsibilities, 29 GA.
ST. BAR J. 111 (1992) (noting that the entire legal system suffers as a result of
pre-trial misconduct and that the trial judge should promptly hear discovery dis-
putes and promptly impose sanctions); Florrie Y. Roberts, Pre-Tal Sanctions: An
Empirical Study, 23 PAC. L.J. 1, 45 (1991) (after conducting a study of pretrial
sanctions in the Central District of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, not-
ing that even though the study did not analyze judges' decisions as to correctness,
"certain trends were evident which revealed that the judges may not be using
their power to sanction to the full extent possible in order to prevent discovery
and other pre-trial abuse"); Marcia Coyle, Afisconduct ChargEd, NATL L.J., Jan. 31,
1994, at 2 (counsel in D.C. case moves for default judgment against a Paul,
Hastings, Janofsky & Walker client because of alleged misconduct by its lawyers
in what reporter describes as a 'nasty discovery battle"); Joseph Kelner & Robert
S. Kelner, Discovery Abuses, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 23, 1993, at 3 (ViAlctive trial practitio-
ners [in New York] can attest to the fact that the [discovery) process is being
widely overworked and abused."); Robert E. Shapiro, Wrestling with the Discovery
Demons, LmGATIoN, Fall 1991, at 14-15 (!Abusive discovery tactics work because
judges hate discovery disputes and are too busy to understand them, and because
the very rules have become weapons for the wily. To stop the abuse, you must get
the judge's attention.").
See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 US.
639, 643 (1976) (per curiam). In this landmark decision, the Supreme Court ex-
pressly authorized courts to use sanctions as a general deterrent: "[Severe sanc-
tions must be available to district courts] not merely to penalize those whose con-
duct may be deemed to warrant such a sanction, but to deter those who might be
tempted to such conduct in the absence of a deterrent." Id. The Supreme Court
has not addressed this issue since National Hockey. Thus, courts ought to consider
general deterrence a primary purpose when imposing sanctions.
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I. RULE 37 AND SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
Rule 37 was originally adopted in 1938 by the Supreme
Court as part of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which
govern procedure for federal courts to follow in civil cases. It
was originally entitled "Refusal to Make Discovery; Conse-
quences."2 Since 1938, Rule 37 has been amended several
times-in 1948, 1970, 1980 and again in 1993.2" Two seminal
Supreme Court cases provide insight into how the rule was
originally fashioned." In both cases, the Supreme Court grap-
pled with the propriety of imposing litigation-ending sanctions
on a party for refusing to comply with a discovery order. The
holdings in both of these cases were considered when Rule 37
was first drafted.
In Hovey v. Elliot,' decided in 1897, the defendants' an-
swer was stricken and a decree pro confesso24 was entered
against them for failure to obey a court order requiring the
defendants to show cause why they should not be decreed to be
in contempt of court.' The Supreme Court concluded that
precluding a party from the right to defend an action on the
merits, absent a hearing, denied the defendant due process. 6
The holding in Hovey was substantially modified twelve years
20 See generally 6 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE %
37.01 (2d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1994-95) [hereinafter MOORE'S]; CHARLES A. WRIGHT
ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D § 2281 (2d ed. 1994) [hereinaf-
ter WRIGHT MILLER].
2" MOORE'S, supra note 20, % 37.01l1][5][7]; WRIGHT MILLER, supra note 20, §
2281.
See infra 23-32 and accompanying text.
167 U.S. 409 (1897).
24 A decree pro confesso is "[a] term applied to a bill in equity, and the decree
founded upon it, where no answer is made to it by the defendant. Under rules
practice, this has been replaced by a default for want of prosecution." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1207 (6th ed. 1990).
25 Hovey, 167 U.S. at 411-12; see WRIGHT MILLER, supra note 20, § 2283 (dis-
cussing this case and other Supreme Court precedents concerning the constitution-
al limits on Rule 37 sanctions). For general commentaries regarding constitutional-
ity questions with respect to discovery sanctions, see Note, The Constitutional
Limits of Discovery, 35 IND. L.J. 347, 348-50 (1960); Note, Recent Innovations to
Pretrial Discovery Sanctions: Rule 37 Reinterpreted, 1959 DUKE L.J. 278, 282-83
(discussing what the author characterizes as the constitutional problem "lurking
within the text of rule 37" with respect to a dismissal for noncompliance without
full adjudication on the merits) [hereinafter Rule 37 Reinterpreted].
2' Hovey, 167 U.S. at 413-14.
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later in Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas.' In Hammond,
the Supreme Court affirmed a judgment that struck a party's
answer and granted default judgment against the party for its
failure to produce books, papers and witnesses in a state anti-
trust suit.O The Court distinguished Hovey by noting that due
process had been denied in that case by the coures refusal to
hear the party.' It reasoned, however, that due process had
been preserved in Hammond because by refusing to produce
evidence material to the administration of due process, the
party admitted that the case lacked merit."
The Advisory Committee, a group of lawyers and law pro-
fessors selected by the Supreme Court to prepare and submit
draft rules of federal procedure," wanted to bring Rule 37
within the Court's "doctrine" as defined by the Rule's early
cases, Hovey and Hammond. The advisory notes to the original
version of Rule 37 stated that the rule was drafted in accor-
dance with the decisions in Hovey and Hammond in that it
justified the use of drastic sanctions to compel a party to pro-
duce evidence. 2 However, the rule did not justify the use of
such sanctions for the mere purpose of punishing a party s
While the Advisory Committee Notes explained when harsh
sanctions might be appropriate, the rule itself provided no
clarification.' So despite the Advisory Committee's Notes re-
garding Rule 37 sanctions, constitutional questions concerning
the imposition of severe sanctions remained.' Particularly
1 212 U.S. 322 (1909); see Societe Internationale Pour Participations
Industrielles et Conmerciales, SA. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 209 (1958) (in which
the Supreme Court stated that Hammond "substantially modified" its earlier deci-
sion in Hovey).
2s Hammond, 212 U.S. at 350-51.
29 Id.
so Id.
31 FED. R. Cxv. P. at 5.
2 WRIGHT MILLER, supra note 20, § 2283 n.9.
WRIGHT MaLLER, supra note 20, § 2283 n.9.
The rule itself makes no distinction between sanctioning a party in order to
compel production of evidence and sanctioning a party merely to punish. WRIGHT
MILLER, supra note 20, § 2283 n.9.
"5 For instance, the question remained whether entry of a harsh sanction vio-
lated a party's right to due process if the failure to comply was not willful. The
rule did not distinguish between deliberate and willful misconduct as opposed to
mere inability to comply. For a general commentary, see WRIGHT MILER, supra
note 20, § 2283; see also Richard H. Williams, Comment, Pleading, Practice and
Procedure: Sanctions for Enforcement of Discouery-Constitutionality of Rule 37, 37
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troublesome to litigants, and later addressed in Societe
Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et
Commerciales, SA. v. Rogers," was the concern that a good
faith failure to produce did not justify the imposition of harsh
sanctions."
In Societe Internationale, a case decided subsequent to
Rule 37's enactment, the plaintiffs action had been dismissed
in the court below for failure to produce documents. 8 The
lower court ignored the fact that the plaintiff was unable, rath-
er than unwilling, to comply with the order to produce. 9 The
Supreme Court reversed and held that "Rule 37 should not be
construed to authorize dismissal... when it has been estab-
lished that failure to comply has been due to inability, and not
to willfulness, bad faith, or any fault of petitioner."4" Societe
Internationale held that due process precludes the harshest of
sanctions where the party to be sanctioned is unable to comply
with a court's discovery order. Moreover, the Societe
Internationale holding implied that lesser sanctions are appro-
priate even in the absence of bad faith. Congress embraced
Societe Internationale's holding, as evidenced by the 1970
amendments to Rule 37.
The Advisory Committee Notes to the 1970 amendment
state that "[e]xperience has brought to light a number of de-
fects in the language of the rule as well as instances in which
it is not serving the purposes for which it was designed."41
The "defect" was that the rule sometimes referred to a party's
"refusal" to comply with a discovery order and other times re-
ferred merely to a party's "failure" to do so.42 In order to elim-
WASH. L. REV. 175, 177-81 (1962) (discussing Washington's rules of procedure by
explaining the constitutionality of Rule 37 and Hovey, Hammond and Societe Inte-
rnationale); Rule 37 Reinterpreted, supra note 25, at 287-90 (discussing seminal
Supreme Court cases and the "constitutional pitfalls" of Rule 37).
2' 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
See WRIGHT MILLER, supra note 20, § 2283.
28 Societe Internationale, 357 U.S. at 201. The case was dismissed despite the
fact that the Master found that plaintiff had proven good faith efforts to comply
with a production request but could not produce the requested documents without
violating Swiss law.
3 Id.
40 Id. at 212.
41 MOORE's, supra note 20, % 37.01[6] (citation omitted).
42 MOORE'S, supra note 20, -J 37.01[6] (citation omitted); see Maurice Rosenberg,
Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrial Discovery, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 480, 489-91 (1958)
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inate this confusion, and to conform the rule, with Societe
Internationale, the rule was amended to substitute the word
"failure" for "refusal" throughout.43 Rule 37, as amended in
1970, authorized sanctions for any "failure" to comply with a
discovery order regardless of the party's willfulness or bad
faith. However, willfulness or bad faith was still relevant in
selecting an appropriate sanction." Although the Advisory
Committee Notes explain this distinction, and clearly point out
that severe sanctions are only appropriate if there is proof of
willfulness or bad faith, to this day the rule itself contains no
such distinction."
Subsequent to the 1970 amendments, the Supreme Court
made its strongest pronouncement with respect to the imposi-
tion of litigation-ending sanctions in National Hockey League v.
Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc."6 In National Hockey, the Su-
preme Court reversed a Third Circuit decision which held that
dismissal was too harsh a sanction for the discovery abuse in-
volved in the case.47 By reversing the Third Circuit, the Su-
preme Court endorsed, even encouraged, other courts to utilize
the extreme sanction of dismissal' Characterizing the defen-
dant club's failure to comply with a discovery order as "fla-
grant bad faith" and "a callous disregard of its responsibili-
ties," the Supreme Court held that dismissal was an appro-
priate sanction to impose.49 What is most strildng about Na-
tional Hockey is the Supreme Court's determination that sanc-
tions are meant to deter all litigants in all courts, not merely
the offending party in any particular litigation:
IThe most severe in the spectrum of sanctions provided by statute
or rule must be available to the district court in appropriate cases,
(criticizing Rule 37 for its inconsistent use of the words "failure" and "refusal');
Rule 37 Reinterpreted, supra note 25, Rule 37 Reinterpreted, at 284-86 (exploring
the problem of the "refusal-failure" dichotomy).
MAOORE'S, supra note 20, 37.01[6].
" MOORE's, supra note 20, 1 37.0116].
"See supra note 32 and accompanying text regarding the fact that the Advi-
sory Committee Note to the original version of Rule 37 also discu s the propri-
ety of sanction imposition in certain situations, but that such a distinction ap-
peared nowhere in the text of the rule.
" 427 U.S. 639 (1976) (per curiam).
47 Id. at 643.
"Id. at 639.
4Id.
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not merely to penalize those whose conduct may be deemed to war-
rant such a sanction, but to deter those'who might be tempted to
such conduct in the absence of a deterrent. If the decision [below
remained undisturbed], it might well be that these respondents
would faithfully comply with all future discovery orders entered by
the District Court in this case. But other parties to other lawsuits
would feel freer than we think Rule 37 contemplates they should
feel to flout other discovery orders of other district courts."
Prior to National Hockey general deterrence was not an
established or even articulated goal of sanctions, particularly
the imposition of harsh sanctions. The purpose of sanctions
under Rule 37(b)(2), as expressed by the Court in cases like
Hovey and Hammond and by the Advisory Committee in its
commentaries, was simply to secure compliance with discovery
orders.5 National Hockey changed this. After National Hock-
ey, courts were free to use sanctions not only to compel a par-
ticular party to comply with a discovery order, but also to send
a message to all litigants that discovery orders must be fol-
lowed. National Hockey, therefore, represented a dramatic shift
in the focus and purpose of sanction imposition.
Equally noteworthy in the National Hockey decision is the
Court's admonition to reviewing courts to apply strictly the
abuse of discretion standard with respect to these types of
cases. The Supreme Court warned the reviewing courts to
avoid the "natural tendency" to be influenced by the severity of
outright dismissal because it has the benefit of hindsight.' It
reminded appellate courts that "[tihe question, of course, is not
whether this Court, or whether the Court of Appeals, would as
an original matter have dismissed the action; it is whether the
District Court abused its discretion in so doing."53
National Hockey, and the deterrence goal it established
with respect to discovery sanction imposition, has been the
subject of numerous articles and commentaries.' Since this
" Id. For a detailed discussion on the importance of deterrence with respect to
imposing discovery sanctions, see Cady, supra note 18 at 517-22.
" See WRIGHT MILLER, supra note 20, §§ 2281, 2283 n.9. ("Sanctions are in-
tended to prompt a party to respond.").
52 National Hockey, 427 U.S. at 642.
" Id. For a general commentary on the abuse of discretion standard, see Hen-
ry J. Friendly, Indiscretion about Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747 (1982).
1 See, e.g., John W. Heiderscheit III, Rule 37 Discovery Sanctions in the Ninth
Circuit: The Collapse of the Deterrence Goal, 68 OR. L. REV. 67 (1989); Kathy
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1976 per curiam decision, the Supreme Court has not issued a
single opinion regarding sanctions for discovery abuse under
Rule 37(b)(2).ss Thus, in the last two decades the lower feder-
al courts have been left to their own devices in fashioning
policies and procedures that embody the National Hockey hold-
ing. Prior to 1970 district courts seemed hesitant to impose
discovery sanctions. Since the 1970 amendments of Rule 37
and National Hockey, however, it appears that sanctions have
been more readily imposed by district courts.' Particularly in
the last five years there appears to be a greater inclination by
district courts to impose harsh sanctions for discovery abuse'
Bidegaray Irigoin, Rule 37 Sanctions: Deterrents to Discovery Abuses, 46 Mo"T. L.
REV. 95 (1985); Charles B. Renfrew, Discovery Sanctions: A Judicial Perspective, 67
CAL. L. REV. 264 (1979); Note, The Emerging Deterrence Orientation in the Imposi-
tion of Discovery Sanction, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1033 (1978).
"' However, this should not be interpreted to mean that no controversy or
problem exists with respect to imposing Rule 37(b)(2) litigation-ending sanctions.
More than likely, litigants faced with such a sanction do not even attempt a peti-
tion for certiorari to the Supreme Court. Not only is such a pursuit co3tly, but the
chance of success, even if certiorari is granted, is quite slim. In National Hockey,
the Supreme Court made clear its position regarding the abuse of discretion sta-
ndard. The Court criticized the Third Circuit for departing from the standard and
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. If a court of appeals has
determined that the imposition of a litigation-ending sanction was not an abuse of
discretion, it is highly unlikely that the Supreme Court would upset such a deci-
sion. Therefore, the incentive for a party upon which a litigation-ending sanction
has been imposed to petition for certiorari is not high.
See WRIGHT MLLER, supra note 20, § 2281.
This increased willingness to impose harsh sanctions might also be attribut-
ed to the Civil Justice Reform Act ("CJRA"), 28 U.S.C. § 471-82 (1990). The CJRA
was passed in part as a response to what was deemed by the bench and bar as
pervasive discovery abuse and its negative effect on judicial efficiency. One scholar
has written a compelling piece concerning the CJRA and the myth of pervasive
discovery abuse. See Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth
of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemo.hing, 46
STAN. L. REv. 1393 (1994). Professor Mullenix argues that the pervasive myth of
discovery abuse rests upon "inadequate social science findings," and that politi-
cians, lawyers, judges, insurance companies and other intereted parties have ma-
nipulated the media to identify American litigiousness as a societal ill, particularly
discovery abuse. Id. at 1396-97. The National Law Journal reported in May 1993
that [two new studies of civil discovery--the first in a decade--conclude that for
most cases, 'formal discovery is not out of control,' and the bench and bar can
correct problems that do exist without adopting major changes in the rules govern-
ing discovery." Randall Samborn, Fuel Reform Opposition Report,: Little Discovery
Abuse, NAT'L L.J., May 31, 1993, at 3. Nonetheless, right or wrong, there is no
question that lawyers, judges and the general public believe that discovery abuse
is both common and ubiquitous. See, e.g., Carol W. Hunstein, The Decline of Pro-
fessionalism, 29 GA. ST. BAR J. 111 (1992) ("Not all of the criticism directed at
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW[6
Not surprisingly, each circuit approaches the imposition of
litigation-ending sanctions differently. In order to clarify the
Second Circuit's approach and demonstrate its weaknesses, it
is necessary to examine the different approaches employed by
other circuits.
II. OTHER CRCUITS' APPROACHES TO IMPOSING LITIGATION-
ENDING SANCTIONS
The most striking feature about other circuits' approaches
to imposing litigation-ending sanctions under Rule 37(b)(2) is
that no single approach is followed by more than one circuit.
Similar to the Second Circuit, 8 the First, Seventh, Eighth
and Eleventh Circuits do not have an articulated set of stan-
dards that district courts must consider prior to imposing liti-
gation-ending sanctions.59 The Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
Ninth and Tenth Circuits, however, have implemented firm
standards by which to judge the propriety of imposing litiga-
tion-ending sanctions.'o
The factors considered by some or all of the circuits are:
(1) the willfulness or bad faith of the noncompliant party; (2)
the amount of prejudice noncompliance has on the moving
party; (3) the efficacy of lesser sanctions; (4) whether imposi-
tion of a sanction promotes general deterrence; (5) the
noncompliant party's history of dilatory conduct; (6) whether
the noncompliant party was warned of the possibility of harsh
sanction imposition; (7) whether the failure to comply was the
our profession is undeserved. This is particularly true in the area of discovery
S.. ."); Susan Keilitz et. al., Attorneys' View of Civil Discovery, 32 JUDGE'S J. 2
(1993) ("Criticism of the civil discovery process is neither new nor limited to a
vocal minority. Earlier surveys of attorneys practicing in federal district courts ...
indicate significant discontent with the discovery process. Moreover, two major
efforts to amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure within the past decade as
well as the enactment of the [CJRA] demonstrate a widely shared interest in re-
forming the discovery process in the federal courts."); Ward Wagner, Jr. & Helen
Wagner McAfee, Combatting Discovery Abuse, TRIAL DIPL. J., Winter 1992, at 197
("Discovery abuse unfortunately has become commonplace in litigation practice.").
'8 See infra Parts III, IV and V.
' For a discussion regarding circuit courts without a test, see infra pp. 598-
603.60 See infra notes 103-108 discussing the various tests employed by the other
circuit courts.
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attorney's fault or that of the client; and (8) general policy mat-
ters such as judicial efficiency and preferences for disposing of
cases on their merits.
The difference among approaches can be attributed to each
circuit's policy perspective with respect to balancing the desire
to have a case litigated on its merits with the importance of
order and efficiency in courts. While some circuits are extreme-
ly protective of a party's right to its day in court, others place
more emphasis on judicial discretion, judicial efficiency and
general deterrence.
A. Circuits without a Test
Even the circuits that do not have fixed standards by
which to measure the propriety of imposing litigation-ending
sanctions-the First, Seventh, Eighth and Eleventh Cir-
cuits-do have approaches to sanction imposition that are
noteworthy. The First Circuit is sensitive to the policy implica-
tions of denying a litigant the right to try a case on its merits,
although it does not require a district court to consider any
particular set of factors prior to imposing sanctions under Rule
37(b)(2). Dismissal or default sanctions in the First Circuit run
"counter to [its] strong policy favoring the disposition of cases
on their merits... [such that] fairness requires that some
limits be placed on [the use of dismissal or default as a sanc-
tion]."6 To determine if conduct is sufficiently serious to war-
rant a litigation-ending sanction, the district court must con-
sider all the factors involved." These factors may include the
party's level of culpability, whether the misconduct is occa-
sioned by counsel or by the client, the amount of time involved,
the number of instances of misconduct, disadvantage to the
adverse party and the progress of the litigation.'
The First Circuit strictly construes Rule 37(b)(2) and fa-
vors adherence to the National Hockey general deterrence
doctrine.' If a party refuses to comply with a valid order, less
" Velazquez-Rivera v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 920 F.2d 1072, 1075-76 (1st Cir.
1990) (citations omitted).
6 Id. at 1076.
"See, eg., Damiani v. Rhode Island Hosp., 704 F.2d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1983)
(affirming dismissal of an antitrust suit for plaintiffs failure to respond to inter-
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drastic sanctions need not precede the imposition of a litiga-
tion-ending sanction because nothing in Rule 37(b)(2) so re-
quires.65 It is of no consequence if noncompliance is solely the
attorney's fault. In Damiani v. Rhode Island Hospital,' the
First Circuit affirmed dismissal of plaintiffs case for repeated
failure to respond to interrogatories and rejected the argument
that attorney misconduct should not be visited upon an inno-
cent client.67 Thus, the First Circuit recognizes the need for
litigation-ending sanctions and encourages their use when
necessary.' However, absent an order compelling discovery
and a subsequent failure to comply with that order, sanctions
are not warranted.69 Moreover, in a close case, its policy is
that "doubts should be resolved in favor of adjudicating con-
tested claims on the merits"70 rather than imposing litigation-
ending sanctions.
Likewise, the Seventh Circuit is conscious of the need for
its district courts to balance the appropriate use of harsh sanc-
tions with the principle that it does not "cabin unrealistically
the needed discretion of the district courts . . . .71 In one case,
the Seventh Circuit remanded a dismissal sanction because the
district court failed to explain the basis for its determination
rogatories and requests for production of documents and citing National Hockey as
support for its holding).
5 Morgan v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 901 F.2d 186, 195 (1st Cir. 1990)
(citing Damiani, 704 F.2d at 15).
704 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1983).
"The argument that the sins of the attorney should not be visited on the
client is a seductive one, but its siren call is overborne by the nature of the ad-
versary system ... [and the First Circuit] turn[s] a deaf ear to this plea."
Damiani, 704 F.2d at 16-17 (citation omitted); accord, Barreto v. Citibank, 907
F.2d 15, 16 (1st Cir. 1990).
" See Barreto, 907 F.2d at 16 (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with
order rejecting and definitively affirming the innocent client argument); Damiani,
704 F.2d at 17 (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with discovery order).
" Such a situation occurred in United States v. One 1987 BMW 325, 985 F.2d
655, 660-62 (1st Cir. 1993); accord, United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Baker
Material Handling Corp., 62 F.3d 24, 28-29 (1st Cir. 1995) (noting that party can-
not complain after the fact about discovery violations but must move to compel at
the time of the violation); R.W. Int'l Corp. v. Welch Foods, Inc., 937 F.2d 112 (1st
Cir. 1991) (reversing and dismissing action for failure to answer questions in depo-
sition because there was no order compelling answers to questions and deponent
appeared for deposition).
"' Velazquez-Rivera v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 920 F.2d 1072, 1079 (1st Cir. 1990)
(citations omitted).
71 In re Scheri, 51 F.3d 71, 75 (7th Cir. 1995).
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that dismissal was appropriate. 2 The Seventh Circuit cau-
tioned that deferential review of sanction determinations
should not be confused with no review.73
Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit has affirmed the imposi-
tion of litigation-ending sanctions on numerous occasions. For
example, in Halas v. Consumer Services, Inc.,"' the Seventh
Circuit affirmed dismissal of plaintiffs case for his knowing
failure to attend his deposition and subsequent failure to re-
spond in writing to the court regarding his noncompliance."
In Patterson v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., the Seventh Circuit
affirmed dismissal against a plaintiff for failure to name an
expert within the district court's imposed deadline." Despite
the harshness of a litigation ending sanction, the Seventh Cir-
cuit, like the First Circuit, believes it is "axiomatic that the
district court need not impose a lesser sanction prior to assess-
ing the sanction of dismissal."8
It seems difficult, however, to determine what type of
misconduct will be deemed sufficient to warrant a litigation-
ending sanction in the Seventh Circuit. In Stafford v.
Mesnik,7 s the Seventh Circuit held that the defendants ab-
sence from one meeting was an inadequate basis for entering
default judgment against him.' The Seventh Circuit ex-
plained its reversal by distinguishing Stafford from a number
of other Seventh Circuit cases where default or dismissal was
affirmed. It noted that the "degree of egregiousness" justifying
I Id. Other courts have also reversed or remanded the imposition of a harsh
sanction when the district courts have not articulated fully the rationales behind
their decisions. See, eg., Regional Refuse Sys., Inc. v. Inland Reclamation Co., 842
F.2d 150, 154 (6th Cir. 1988) (distinguishing an earlier case in the circuit in
which dismissal was reversed because the district court failed to articulate its
rationale for dismissal on the record, from instant case in which district court's
memorandum included "extensive and painstaking examination of the basis for its
dismissal").
' In re Scheri, 51 F.3d at 75. The First Circuit has also stated that its defer-
ence to district court rulings should not be confused with "automatic acquiescence"
or with rubber stamping. One 1987 BMW 325, 985 F.2d at 657 (citation omitted).
7' 16 F.3d 161 (7th Cir. 1994).
7r Id- at 162-63.
76 852 F.2d 280 (7th Cir. 1988).
" Id. at 285.
", Halas, 16 F.3d at 165.
79 63 F.3d 1445 (7th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1451.
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the sanctions in these other cases was absent in Stafford."
Beyond this vague, general statement the Seventh Circuit did
not distinguish between particular factors that constitute egre-
gious behavior justifying a harsh sanction and misconduct not
warranting the imposition of such a sanction.82
The Eighth Circuit's approach to imposing litigation-end-
ing sanctions is overwhelmingly policy-driven.s Although few-
er cases exist in the Eighth Circuit regarding this issue, there
are certainly cases that provide litigants with insight into the
Eighth Circuit's approach. For instance, in Avionic Co. v. Gen-
eral Dynamics Corp.,' dismissal was affirmed because of a
plaintiffs failure to comply with a discovery order. Here, the
Eighth Circuit held that oral notice to compel discovery was a
sufficient basis for Rule 37(b)(2) sanctions." The Eighth Cir-
cuit also proclaimed that in "this circuit, before dismissing a
case under Rule 37(b)(2) the [district] court must investigate
whether a sanction less extreme than dismissal would suffice,
unless the party's failure was deliberate or in bad faith.""
In a recent unpublished opinion, the Eighth Circuit found
that the pro se plaintiff was warned that failure to attend a
deposition might lead to dismissal and the plaintiff, nonethe-
less, willfully failed to appear."7 Dismissal was affirmed."
81 Id.
82 However, it may not be realistic for a circuit court to discuss the propriety
of a district court's sanction determination because of the abuse of discretion stan-
dard of review. Admittedly, the factual circumstances warrafiting a determination
regarding sanction imposition are discussed, reviewed and handled primarily at the
district court level. This Note does not delve into district courts' determinations
save for the Bambu case. See infra Part IV. It is only at the circuit court level
that policy concerning sanction imposition is made. Thus, absent direction and
guidance from above, it is unlikely that district courts will make consistent deci-
sions from a policy standpoint.
' See Edgar v. Slaughter, 548 F.2d 770, 772 (8th Cir. 1977) ("There is a
strong policy favoring a trial on the merits and against depriving a party of his
day in court. [The Eighth Circuit's] cases reflect the proper balance between the
conflicting policies of the need to prevent delays and the sound public policy of
deciding cases on their merits.") (citation omitted); see also infra pp. 612-13 and
accompanying notes.
957 F.2d 555 (8th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 558.
88 Id.
Meints v. DeWitt, 68 F.3d 478, 478 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (unpub-
lished disposition). Even though this decision has no precedential value, it demon-
strates a recent application of sanction imposition in the Eighth Circuit.
" Id.
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However, in Edgar v. Slaughter," the Eighth Circuit reversed
a default judgment against the plaintiff on a counterclaim for
failure to comply with an order to respond to interrogatories
because noncompliance was the fault of the attorney and not
the client." Thus, in order for a deliberate failure to warrant
harsh sanctions in the Eighth Circuit, the court may consider
whether the misconduct was that of the client and not only the
attorney.
9
'
The Eleventh Circuit appears to be concerned with pro-
tecting litigants' rights to trials on the merits of cases. In Mal-
autea v. Suzuki Motor Co.," the Eleventh Circuit identified
three "factors" that its district courts may consider when deter-
mining the appropriateness of a litigation-ending sanction.
First, Rule 37(b)(2) gives district judges broad discretion to
fashion appropriate sanctions for violation of discovery orders,
but the discretion is guided by the rule that a litigation-ending
sanction requires willful or bad faith failure to obey a discovery
order.9" In addition, the sanction must be 'just' and represent
general due process restrictions on the courfs discretion.'
Finally, the "severe sanction of a dismissal or default judgment
is appropriate only as a last resort, when less drastic sanctions
would not ensure compliance with the court's orders." 5 Guid-
ed by these three "factors," the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a de-
fault judgment for defendants' willful violation of three clear
orders." Also, in affirming a dismissal of a pro se plaintiffs
548 F.2d 770 (8th Cir. 1977).
"o Prior to dismissal or entering a default judgment, fundamental fairness
should require a district court to enter an order to show cause and hold a hear-
ing, if deemed necessary, to determine whether assessment of costs and attorney
fees or even an attorney's citation for contempt would be a more just and effective
sanction." Id. at 773.
" Id.; see infra Part 1I.B.3.d for a discussion of the attorney-client issue with
respect to circuits that do have tests for litigation-ending sanction imposition.
987 F.2d 1536 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 863 (1993).
I& at 1542 (citing Societe Internationale).
9Id. (citing Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Campagnie des Bauzites de
Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 707 (1982)). Campagnie des Bauxites places two restrictions
on sanction imposition: (1) that the sanction relate to the matter in dispute; and
(2) that it be just.
Id. (citation omitted). This position is consistent only with the goal of pun-
ishing a party for failure to comply for the purpose of ensuring compliance with
respect to the case at hand only. General deterrence as a goal and purpose of
sanction imposition seems to be forgotten.
I& at 1543.
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complaint, the Eleventh Circuit explained that "[wlhile dis-
missal is an extraordinary remedy, dismissal upon disregard of
an order, especially where the litigant is forewarned, generally
is not an abuse of discretion."97
Although one might conclude that the Eleventh Circuit has
a consistent approach to determining the propriety of litiga-
tion-ending sanctions, such a conclusion is not warranted. The
three factors discussed in Malautea are not consistently ap-
plied. In a number of other cases, these "factors" are not even
mentioned.9 This suggests that merely identifying important
factors to consider is not sufficient. It is more desirable that a
circuit require consistent application of particular factors.'
Decisions rendered in circuits without a defined approach
to litigation-ending sanctions undoubtedly comply with mini-
mum due process requirements and adhere to Supreme Court
precedent regarding the propriety of sanction imposition be-
cause the minimum due process threshold, as discussed supra,
is not particularly difficult to maintain. Yet, it is difficult to
determine whether these courts effectively balance the compet-
ing policies inherent in deciding whether to impose severe
sanctions on a party. The difficulty partly results from a lack
of fixed standards by which to measure the propriety of a sanc-
tion.'00 In short, what is troublesome about an undefined ap-
proach is that sanction imposition has a tendency to become a
game of chance-a "roll of the dice"' 0 '-because so much de-
pends on how a particular district court chooses to impose
harsh sanctions. Thus, the purpose underlying sanction imposi-
tion, particularly in the area of general deterrence, is under-
mined. If sanction imposition is to have any substantive deter-
rent effect on litigants, it must be as consistent and certain as
possible."2
' Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 863
(1989).
"' See BankAtlantic v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc., 12 F.3d 1045 (11th
Cir. 1994); Devaney v. Continental Am. Ins. Co., 989 F.2d 1154 (11th Cir. 1993).
" See infra pp. 624, 628-29 concerning the desirability of having a formal test
in place.
1" The shortcomings attributable to this unsteady approach are explored in
greater detail in Part V of this Note discussing the Second Circuit.
101 The Second Circuit explicitly stated so in Bambu Sales, Inc. v. Ozak Trading
Inc., 58 F.3d 849, 853 (2d Cir. 1995) ("Defendants rolled the dice on the district
coures tolerance for deliberate obstruction and they lost.") (emphasis added).
" "[Apparent haphazard judicial sanctioning results in predictability difficulties
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B. Circuits with a Test
1. Preface
Several circuits-namely, the Third, 113  Fourth,"°4
Fifth,1 5  Sixth,10 s Ninth10 7  and Tenth"' Circuits-have
and uncertainty for litigators." Susan A. Yager, Discovery Abuse: Have the 1933
Amendments to the Federal Rule Curbed the Problem?, 37 FED'N INS. & CORP.
COUNS. Q. 399, 409 (1987). The lack of an objective standard encourages attorneys
to continue their abusive practices. Id. at 416.
" See, e.g., Harris v. City of Philadelphia, 47 F.3d 1311, 1330 n.18 (3d Cir.
1995) (identifying six factors considered by Third Circuit in levying the sanction of
dismissal for failure to obey discovery orders: (1) extent of party's personal re3pon-
sibility; (2) prejudice to adversary caused by failure to meet scheduling orders and
to respond to discovery; (3) history of dilatoriness; (4) whether conduct of party or
attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) effectiveness of sanctions other than dis-
missal, which entails analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) meritoriousness of
claim or defense) (citation omitted).
10, See, e.g., Mutual Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Richards & Assocs., Inc., 872
F.2d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 1989) (competing interests involved in judgment by default
require application of four-part test in Fourth Circuit: (1) whether noncomplying
party acted in bad faith; (2) the amount of prejudice the noncompliance caused the
adversary, which necessarily includes an inquiry into the materiality of the evi-
dence not produced; (3) the need for deterrence of the particular sort of noncompli-
ance; and (4) the effectiveness of less drastic sanctions).
' See, e.g., FDIC v. Conner, 20 F.3d 1376, 1380-81 (5th Cir. 1994) (The Fifth
Circuit has articulated several factors that must be present before a district court
may dismiss a case as a sanction for violating a discovery order. (1) refusal to
comply results from willfulness or bad faith accompanied by clear record of delay
or contumacious conduct; (2) violation of the discovery order attributable to the
client instead of the attorney;, (3) violating party's misconduct substantially prej-
udices the opposing party;, and (4) a less drastic sanction would not substantially
achieve the desired deterrent effect).
" See, e.g., Beil v. Lakewood Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 15 F.3d 646, 552 (6th Cir.
1994) (The Sixth Circuit announced several factors that should be considered when
deciding whether a district court abused its discretion by imposing litigation-ending
sanctions, including whether the adversary was prejudiced by the dismissed party's
failure to cooperate, whether the dismissed party was warned that failure could
lead to dismissal, and whether less drastic sanctions were imposed or considered
before dismissal was ordered); see also Wexell v. Komar Indus., Inc., 18 F.3d 916,
920 (Fed Cir. 1994) (applying Sixth Circuit law and reiterating its test).
' See, e.g., Henry v. Gill Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 948 (9th Cir. 1993) (five-
factor test used by Ninth Circuit to determine propriety of imposition of litigation-
ending sanction. District court must weigh. (1) public's interest in expeditious
resolution of litigation; (2) court's need to manage its dockets; (3) risk of prejudice
to party seeking sanctions; (4) public policy of favoring disposition of cases on
their merits; and (5) availability of less drastic sanctions) (citation omitted);, see
also Refac Intl, Ltd. v. Hitachi, Ltd., 921 F.2d 1247, 1253-54 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(applying Ninth Circuit law and same five-factor test).1i See, e.g., Jones v. Thompson, 996 F.2d 261, 264 (10th Cir. 1993) ("district
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explicit tests to evaluate the appropriateness of imposing liti-
gation-ending sanctions. No two circuits apply the same test.
Instead, each circuit attempts to balance the competing policies
involved in imposing litigation-ending discovery sanctions
using their own mix of factors. On the one hand, the circuits
strive to preserve judicial discretion and efficiency. District
judges should be able to exercise as much discretion as neces-
sary to ensure that litigants comply with orders and that cases
are controlled by judges and not contumacious parties. On the
other hand, the circuits recognize the value of litigating a case
on its merits and the unfairness of depriving a litigant of his
or her day in court. The different tests employed by the circuits
substantiate their efforts to reconcile these important compet-
ing policies. However, each circuit has different notions of what
is essential for district courts to consider prior to imposing
harsh discovery sanctions. Nevertheless, the tests espoused by
these circuits contain certain common elements.
2. Common Factors-Bad faith, Prejudice to Adversary,
Efficacy of Lesser Sanctions
Certain elements appear in several of the various circuits'
tests. For instance, save for the Ninth Circuit, all of the cir-
cuits consider whether the noncomplying party acted in bad
faith."0 9 This requirement flows from Supreme Court prece-
dent and is also always considered by the Second Circuit."0
Because of due process, it is inappropriate to levy the harshest
of sanctions against a party unable, not unwilling, to comply.
However, no circuit except the Second Circuit has pronounced
that gross negligence suffices to meet the willfulness require-
ment."' The willfulness or bad faith requirement is axiomat-
court is cautioned to consider following factors before choosing dismissal as a just
sanction: (1) degree of actual prejudice to the defendant; (2) amount of interference
with the judicial process; (3) culpability of the litigant; (4) whether the court
warned the party in advance that dismissal of that action would be a likely sanc-
tion for noncompliance; and (5) efficacy of lesser sanctions") (emphasis added) (cita-
tion omitted).
1O For a complete recital of each circuit's test, see supra notes 103-108.
10 See supra pp. 592-94 and accompanying notes regarding Societe Int-
ernationale and the wilfulness requirement, and infra p. 616 regarding the same.
' See infra n. 184 and accompanying text for a discussion of Second Circuit
precedent that establishes this rule; see also infra pp. 654-55 regarding gross neg-
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ic and an element which any court must consider prior to im-
posing dismissal or default for failure to comply with a discov-
ery order."
Another recurring factor among these circuits is the
amount of prejudice noncompliance has caused the adversary
or moving party. "A [party] suffers prejudice if the [noncom-
plying party's] actions impair [the] ability to go to trial or
threaten to interfere... with the rightful decision of the
case."" 3 While the Ninth Circuit characterizes the risk of
prejudice to the party seeking sanctions as a "key" factor,""
the Fifth Circuit has held that the violating party's misconduct
must substantially prejudice the adverse party." The Fourth
Circuit has indicated that considering the amount of prejudice
"necessarily includes an inquiry into the materiality of the
evidence [that a party] failed to produce.""' Interestingly, the
prejudice occasioned by noncompliance is one of the only com-
mon elements recognized by each circuit that employs a
test."7
The only other element common to each of the circuits that
have tests is the efficacy of lesser sanctions."' Unfortunately,
except for the Ninth Circuit, no circuit has articulated the
meaning of this factor or how such a consideration should
affect a determination with respect to sanction imposition."'
Some courts have intimated that litigation-ending sanctions
ligence and this Notes' proposal for the Second Circuit.
12" See supra notes 35-45 and accompanying text discussing the fact that al-
though Rule 37 only describes noncompliance in terms of 'failure" to comply, the
Advisory Committee Notes and case law have dearly stated that bad faith, fault
or their equivalent must be present prior to imposing a litigation-ending sanction.
11. Henry v. Gill Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 948 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation omit-
ted).
.. The other key factor for the Ninth Circuit is the availability of lesser sanc-
tions. Id.
11 Coane v. Ferrara Pan Candy Co., 898 F.2d 1030, 1032 (6th Cir. 1990). Simi-
larly, the Tenth Circuits test requires a district court to consider the amount of
actual prejudice to the moving party. See, eg., Jones v. Thompson, 996 F.2d 261,
264 (10th Cir. 1993).
11 Mutual Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Richards & Assocs., Inc., 872 F.2d 88, 92
(4th Cir. 1989).
17 But see infra p. 658 and accompanying notes discussing why this factor is
not included in the proposed test for the Second Circuit.
' Although not required, it was also something which the magistrate judge in
Bambu purportedly considered. See infra Part IV.C.3.
1 See infra note 121.
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
are only appropriate when the imposition of lesser sanctions
has proven futile.20 Still others are adamant that a court
need not impose lesser sanctions prior to imposing a harsh
sanction such as dismissal or default. 12'
In Malone v. United States Postal Service,122 the Ninth
Circuit dealt comprehensively with this factor explaining what
a district court should do to demonstrate that it has considered
the efficacy of lesser sanctions.23 In Malone, the Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs case for her willful
failure to comply with a pretrial order requiring both parties to
complete a list of their witnesses, each question to be asked of
the witnesses, and file the anticipated responses with the court
by a specified deadline."2 Both parties were warned that no
continuances would be accepted. 25 Yet the plaintiff waited
until two days prior to the deadline to inform the other party
that it refused to comply and did not appeal the order until
after the deadline for compliance had passed. 2 ' The district
court dismissed plaintiffs case. 27 On appeal, the plaintiff ar-
gued that the district court failed to consider the efficacy of
lesser sanctions as required by the Ninth Circuit. 8 The
' See, e.g., FDIC v. Conner, 20 F.3d 1376, 1380 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting that
the court's own precedents instruct that sanctions should not be used lightly and
citing a 1984 decision stating that dismissal is proper only if lesser sanctions have
not worked).
"~' See, e.g., Malone v. United States Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 132 (9th Cir.
1987) ("We have indicated a preference for explicit discussion by the district court
of the feasibility of alternatives when ordering dismissal. However, we have never
held that explicit discussion of alternatives is necessary for an order of dismissal
to be upheld.") (emphasis added) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 819
(1988); see also supra notes 65, 74-75. In the now famous case In re Professional
Hockey Antitrust Litig., 531 F.2d 1188, 1192 (3d Cir. 1976), rev'd sub noma., Na-
tional Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639 (1976), the
Third Circuit stated that it was incumbent on the court to review the possible use
of a less drastic sanction. The Supreme Court in National Hockey, however, never
mentioned the efficacy of lesser sanctions. Instead the Supreme Court focused on
the amount of time involved and the fact that the sanctioned party had been
warned that failure to comply might result in Rule 37 sanctions. Id. at 640-41.
833 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 132; see Hyde & Drath v. Baker, 24 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 1994)
(reiterating the factors to consider enumerated by the Malone court).
" Malone, 833 F.2d at 129.
1 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 130.
'2 Id. at 131.
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Ninth Circuit rejected this argument but discussed at length
the circuit's approach to assessing this factor:
[Tihe following factors are of particular relevance in determining
whether a district court has considered alternatives to dismissal: (1)
Did the court explicitly discuss the feasibility of less drastic sanc-
tions and explain why alternate sanctions would be inadequate? (2)
Did the court implement alternative methods of sanctioning or cur-
ing the malfeasance before ordering dismissal? (3) Did the court
warn the plaintiff of the possibility of dismissal before actually or-
dering dismissal?'
Apparently, with respect to these "common" factors, the
circuits' policies mirror one another. But the various circuits
employing a fixed test also differ from one another. An exami-
nation of certain factors that are not shared by these circuits
follows.
3. Unique Factors
a. General Deterrence
Only the Fourth Circuit explicitly has identified general
deterrence as a factor to be considered before imposing a litiga-
tion-ending sanction.'" Its reason for including deterrence in
its test is summarized by the following statement: "In [some]
cases, not only does the noncomplying party jeopardize his or
her adversary's case by such indifference, but to ignore such
bold challenges to the district court's power would encourage
other litigants to flirt with similar misconduct."'3' It appears
that the Fifth Circuit also evaluates general deterrence when
making discovery sanction determinations.
In FDIC v. Conner,"2 the Fifth Circuit stated that "dis-
missal is usually improper if a less drastic sanction would
substantially achieve the desired deterrent effect."'33 Howev-
Malone, 833 F.2d at 132.
h Mutual Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Richards & Assocs., Inc., 872 F.2d 88, 92
(4th Cir. 1989); see infra pp. 657-59 concerning the deterrence requirement recom-
mended for the Second Circuit to follow.
Richzds, 872 F.2d at 92 (citing National Hockey).
20 F.3d 1376 (5th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1381; see Prince v. Poulos, 876 F.2d 30, 32 (5th Cir. 1989)
("[D]ismissal is proper only in situations where the deterrent value of Rule 37
cannot be substantially achieved by the use of less drastic sanctions.).
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er, nowhere in Conner does the court expound on this state-
ment, nor is deterrence mentioned in other Fifth Circuit litiga-
tion-ending sanction cases.'
b. History of Dilatoriness
Although several circuits undoubtedly consider a party's
history of abusive behavior, only the Third Circuit has defini-
tively articulated that prior conduct must be considered. In
Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 35 the Third Cir-
cuit reluctantly affirmed dismissal with prejudice based on the
plaintiffs' counsel's failure to meet court imposed deadlines as
well as other procedural requirements.' Even though the
Third Circuit affirmed the harsh sanction, it also engaged in a
lengthy discussion of the various factors which the district
court balanced before reaching its decision, including a history
of dilatoriness.'37 Rather than restrictively considering only
the motion to compel before it, the district court weighed what
it deemed a pattern of dilatoriness justifying the imposition of
a harsh sanction.'38 This pattern included the following
noncompliant acts by the plaintiffs: failing to respond to inter-
rogatories propounded by the defendant, failing to file a pre-
trial statement by the date specified by the district court, and
subsequently failing to file the pre-trial statement after being
warned about it by the district court.'
13 In Conner, without ever mentioning or discussing deterrence, the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that dismissal was not warranted under the circumstances of the case
for the following reasons: (1) court found no record of delay or contumacious con-
duct sufficient to warrant dismissal of FDIC's claims; (2) FDIC served supplemen-
tal answers and provided all requested information prior to the district court's
hearing on the motion for sanctions; (3) FDIC's conduct, though admittedly in
violation of the court's order, did not cause defendants to suffer substantial preju-
dice. 20 F.3d at 1381; see Pressey v. Patterson, 898 F.2d 1018, 1023-24 (5th Cir.
1990) (without mentioning deterrence, concluding that sanction striking answer
that was imposed against City for failure to comply with more than one discovery
order was too severe, but remanding for trial court to consider an appropriate
lesser sanction).
3 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984).
138 Id. at 870.
1 Id. at 868. For a critique of this requirement, see infra pp. 656-57 and ac-
companying notes.
138 Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868.
"' Id. at 865.
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c. Warning the Party that Dismissal or Default Is Imminent
The Tenth and Sixth Circuits specifically incorporate a
warning requirement into their imposition of litigation-ending
sanctions.' Neither circuit concerns itself with the paternal-
ism of such a requirement. Moreover, neither circuit specifical-
ly discusses its reasons for including the warning require-
ment."4 Strong pronouncements regarding the imposition of
litigation-ending sanctions in general may provide some in-
sight or guidance. The Tenth Circuit has proclaimed that
"[blecause dismissal with prejudice defeats altogether a
litigant's right to access to the courts, it should be used as a
weapon of last, rather than first, resort. Thus, the warn-
ing is a way of ensuring due process fairness in that the weap-
on is used only as a last resort.
d. Client Versus Attorney Misconduct
Authority in the circuits is split regarding the propriety of
imposing litigation-ending sanctions when noncompliance is
the result of dilatory conduct by counsel and not the client."
"4 But see FDIC v. Conner, 20 F.3d 1376, 1383 (5th Cir. 1994) (.Like all court
orders, discovery orders are to be obeyed when issued, and sanctions for violating
such orders may be imposed without an explicit prior warning or a litany of pre-
cautionary instructions.").
" For example, in the following four Tenth Circuit cases, the warning require-
ment is mentioned but there is no discussion regarding why the requirement ex-
ists: United States v. A&P Arora, Ltd., 46 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir. 1995) (unpublished
opinion); Mobley v. McCormick, 40 F.3d 337 (10th Cir. 1994); Jones v. Thompson,
996 F.2d 261 (10th Cir. 1993); Ehrenhaus v. Reynolds, 965 F.2d 916 (10th Cir.
1992). Ehrenhaus established the Tenth Circuit's "test" and nowhere explains the
court's rationale for including a warning requirement. Likewise, the Sixth Circuit
does not discuss the reason for its warning requirement. See Beil v. Lakewood
Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 15 F.3d 546 (6th Cir. 1994); Regional Refuse Sys. v. Inland
Reclamation Co., 842 F.2d 150 (6th Cir. 1988).
142 Ehrenhaus, 965 F.2d at 920 (citation omitted).
14 See, eg., Coleman v. American Red Cross, 23 F.3d 1091, 1095 (6th Cir.
1994) ("[W]e have increasingly emphasized directly sanctioning the delinquent
lawyer rather than an innocent client."); Prince v. Poulos, 876 F.2d 30, 32 (5th
Cir. 1989) ("[D]ismissal may be inappropriate when neglect is plainly attributable
to an attorney rather than a blameless client ... ."); Malone v. United State3
Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 134 (9th Cir. 1987) (commenting that the court has re-
peatedly rejected arguments that dismissal unfairly punishes a client for the mis-
deeds of its attorney); Carter v. Albert Einstein Medical Ctr., 804 F.2d 805, 808
(3d Cir. 1986) ("We do not favor dismissal of a case when the attorney's delin-
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Some circuits strictly adhere to the principle of Link v. Wabash
Railroad Co.,' that a litigant chooses counsel at his or her
peril.'45 On the other hand, this maxim and its potentially
harsh consequences have been highly criticized. 4 ' Not sur-
prisingly, therefore, some circuits simply do not adhere to
it. 47 The circuits that have departed from the Link rule con-
quencies-not the client's-necessitate sanctions."); Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre
Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 602 F.2d 1062, 1068 (2d Cir. 1979) ("Consid-
erations of fair play may dictate that courts eschew the harshest sanctions provid-
ed by Rule 37 where failure to comply is due to a mere oversight of counsel
amounting to no more than simple negligence.") (citations omitted); Edgar v.
Slaughter, 548 F.2d 770, 773 (8th Cir. 1977) ("[Ihe courts should investigate the
attorney's responsibility as an officer of the court and, if appropriate, impose on
the client sanctions less extreme than dismissal or default, unless it is shown that
the client is deliberately or in bad faith failing to comply with the court's order.").
14 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
1 The Ninth Circuit rejects arguments that dismissal unfairly punishes a liti-
gant for the misdeeds of its attorney. Malone v. United States Postal Serv., 833
F.2d 128, 134 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing other Ninth Circuit cases holding the same).
As discussed supra pp. 598-99, the First Circuit also rejects such arguments. The
Second Circuit, likewise, adheres to the Link doctrine. Cine, 602 F.2d at 1067.
14 See generally Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Discovery Abuse Revisited: Some Specific
Proposals to Amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 26 U.S.F. L. REV. 189,
216 (1992) ("Link, however, was decided by a four-to-three vote and has been
criticized heavily... . [S]ome lower courts limit its application in the discovery
context.") (citing Carter, 804 F.2d at 807-08); Susan Marie Lapenta, Note, Inryco,
Inc. v. Metropolitan Eng'g Co.: Inexcusable Neglect by Whom?, 45 U. P1Tr. L. REV.
695, 695 (1984) ("When the attorney's conduct is grossly negligent, clients should
not be bound by their attorney's behavior."); William R. Mureiko, Note, The Agency
Theory of the Attorney-Client Relationship: An Improper Justification for Holding
Clients Responsible for Their Attorneys' Procedural Errors, 1988 DUKE L.J. 733
(arguing that the agency theory espoused in Link is inconsistent with many poli-
cies that our judicial system holds important and therefore should have no place
in the courts' calculus for fashioning sanctions); Miriam Riskind, Comment, Can a
Client Be Held Liable for Attorney's Misconduct? Let the Client Beware, 15 T.
MARsHALL L. REv. 103 (1990).
14 The Eighth Circuit does not adhere to the Link rule. See supra notes 90-91.
Likewise, the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and D.C. Circuits do not mechanically
apply the Link rule. See Carter v. Albert Einstein Medical Ctr., 804 F.2d 805, 808
(3d Cir. 1986) ("We do not favor dismissal ... when the attorney's delinquen-
cies-not the client's-necessitate sanctions."); Lolatchy v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 816
F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1987) (same); Chilcutt v. United States, 4 F.3d 1313, 1323 (5th
Cir. 1993) ("This Court has often emphasized that an innocent party should not be
severely penalized for the misconduct of its counsel."); Regional Refuse Sys. v.
Inland Reclamation Co., 842 F.2d 150, 155 (6th Cir. 1988) ("[This circuit has been
more ready than others to reverse dismissals . . . when it appears that the party
is blameless .... ");. In Shea v. Donohoe Constr. Co., 795 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.
1986), dismissal was reversed by the circuit because the plaintiff was unaware of
its attorney's failure to attend three status calls. The Shea court discussed the
attorney-client issue at length, citing a number of authorities both in and out of
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sider whether misconduct is solely the attorney's fault before
imposing a harsh sanction that would deprive an innocent
party of its day in court. 48 Only the Fifth Circuit, however,
has articulated explicitly that prior to imposing litigation-end-
ing sanctions a court must consider whether the misconduct is
attributable to the client instead of the attorney."' The Fifth
Circuit requires its district courts to do so because it deems it
unfair to make a blameless client suffer for the attorney's mis-
conduct." This consideration has its limits, though. In
Prince v. Poulos,5 ' the Fifth Circuit affirmed a dismissal
against a plaintiff who repeatedly refused to comply with a
series of discovery orders. In so doing the Fifth Circuit noted
that the attorney-client consideration did not apply because
the plaintiff himself was an attorney "fully aware of his dis-
covery obligations.""2 In short, considering attorney versus
client misconduct is meant to be a shield not a sword.
e. Policy Factors
While other circuits' factors indirectly address the policy
issues being balanced when a court must decide whether to
impose litigation-ending sanctions,153 only the Ninth Circuit's
test includes factors with direct policy implications. The Ninth
Circuit requires its district courts to weigh the public's interest
in expeditious resolution of litigation, the court's need to man-
age its docket, and the public policy favoring disposition of
cases on their merits."5 However, it would be erroneous to
draw the conclusion that the other circuits ignore policy impli-
the circuit to support its proposition. Id. at 1077-78 & n.5. In Jones u. Thompzon,
the Tenth Circuit also intimated that whether noncompliance is the attorney's or
clients fault merits consideration. 996 F.2d 261, 265 (10th Cir. 1993) ([Defen-
dants] have not convinced us they are blameless victims . . .
148 See supra note 147.
148 See, e.g., FDIC v. Conner, 20 F.3d 1376, 1380 (5th Cir. 1994). The author
suggests that the Second Circuit implement a similar requirement. See infra Part
VIJ3.4.
I' Prince v. Poulos, 876 F.2d 30, 33 (5th Cir. 1989).
15 Id.
1Id.
153 For example, the Sixth Circuit engaged in a rather extensive discussion of
policy concerns in Coleman v. American Red Cross, 23 F.3d 1091, 1094-95 (6th
Cir. 1994), reh'g denied.
15. See supra note 107.
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cations. Rather, each circuit's combination of factors should be
viewed as manifestations of their policy concerns regarding
severe sanctions. The very fact that a test is in place demon-
strates a circuit's acknowledgment of the need to balance com-
peting policies inherent in the decision to impose these types of
discovery sanctions.
4. Analysis of Circuits Employing a Test
Every circuit employing a test has identified different
factors its district courts must or should consider prior to im-
posing a litigation-ending sanction. These specific tests guide
district courts, litigants and appellate courts on the propriety
of imposing a severe sanction. By looking at a single litigation-
ending sanction case in the circuit, litigants would know what
factors a district court will consider when determining whether
to levy harsh sanctions for discovery abuse. Some of the ele-
ments considered by the circuits are alike. Many are different.
Currently, no one test can be characterized as the ideal combi-
nation of essential factors. However, the Ninth Circuit and
Fifth Circuit seem to have the most comprehensive tests.155
Arguably, between these two tests, every important consider-
ation can be found.
The fixed standards employed by these circuits stand in
stark contrast to the indiscriminate practice employed by the
Second Circuit. The Second Circuit would benefit from setting
forth a test that incorporates the positive aspects of the
circuits' various approaches. Before analyzing what would be
the ideal test for the Second Circuit, it is first necessary to
" The factors considered by the Ninth Circuit are as follows: (1) public's inter-
est in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) court's need to manage its dockets;
(3) risk of prejudice to party seeking sanctions; (4) public policy of favoring dispo-
sition of cases on their merits; and (5) availability of less drastic sanctions. Henry
v. Gill Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 948 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Porter v. Martinez,
941 F.2d 732, 733 (9th Cir. 1991)). The Fifth Circuit considers the following: (1)
refusal to comply must result from willfulness or bad faith accompanied by clear
record of delay or contumacious conduct; (2) violation of the discovery order must
be attributable to the client instead of the attorney; (3) violating party's miscon-
duct must substantially prejudice the opposing party; and (4) a less drastic sanc-
tion would not substantially achieve the desired deterrent effect. FDIC v. Conner,
20 F.3d 1376, 1380-81 (5th Cir. 1994).
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detail the history and current state of affairs with respect to
litigation-ending sanctions in the Second Circuit.
III. LITIGATION-ENDING SANCTIONS CASES IN THE SECOND
CiRcuIT LEADING UP TO BAMU
The Second Circuit is no stranger to the trend of increased
use of Rule 37(b)(2) discovery sanctions. In fact, it has led the
way in many respects. There are numerous Second Circuit
cases favoring the imposition of litigation-ending sanctions.'
Of course, there are also cases where the Second Circuit re-
versed the imposition of default or dismissal.' Nonetheless,
its decisions seem to mirror the changes and amendments to
Rule 37 and Supreme Court precedent regarding sanction
imposition in the context of discovery abuse. The cases seem to
lack a sense of certainty or predictability. Naturally, it would
be impossible to achieve absolute certainty without stripping a
court of its discretionary powers to levy sanctions. Yet, in order
to achieve a deterrent effect, the cases should be more instruc-
tive to litigants regarding what conduct constitutes abuse war-
ranting dismissal or default. That a court can or may impose a
litigation-ending sanction is clear. However, if there is no stan-
dard by which to measure the various forms of abuse, it is
difficult to envision how any random imposition of sanctions,
harsh or otherwise, could possibly achieve a deterrent effect. If
the outcome depends entirely on a court's discretion, then
sanction imposition has the potential to become a game of
chance-a "roll of the dice"-rather than an effective tool
meant to curb abuse in an individual case and in other cas-
es. 
5
s See infra note 202.
15 See infra note 203.
See Bambu Sales, Inc. v. Ozak Trading Inc., 58 F.3d 849, 853 (2d Cir. 1995)
(The Second Circuit in affirming the default sanction noted that '[djefendants
rolled the dice on the district court's tolerance for deliberate obstruction, and they
lost.") (emphasis added); Heiderscheit supra note 54, at 66-67. ('Deterrence theo-
ry, if it is to work at all, requires... [that] litigants must have a reasonable
ability to accurately perceive the likelihood that their conduct will be punished
and the severity of likely punishments.); Williams, supra note 35 at 182-83 (not-
ing that for discovery process to function properly, Rule 37 must be utilized in a
way that is not too permissive or overly arbitrary).
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The Bambu case is the latest in a series of cases illustrat-
ing the Second Circuit's approach to imposing litigation-ending
sanctions. Supreme Court precedent, particularly National
Hockey, heavily influenced Second Circuit policy regarding
harsh sanctions. Since National Hockey, the Second Circuit's
policies have been both reinforced and refined. Nonetheless,
the approach taken with respect to litigation-ending sanction
cases wavers, and the results in these cases are inconsistent.
What follows is a brief summary of the history of litigation-
ending sanction cases in the Second Circuit as well as a syn-
thesis of recent cases in the circuit.
A. Pre-National Hockey
Prior to the Supreme Court's holding in National Hockey,
general deterrence was not a goal espoused by the Second
Circuit with respect to sanction imposition. In fact, it appears
that Second Circuit courts, at that time, cautiously reviewed
the imposition of harsh sanctions and disfavored their use.6 9
Apparently conscious of the constitutional and general
fairness concerns enumerated by the Supreme Court in Hovey
v. Elliott" and Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas,' the
Second Circuit placed great emphasis on a party's willfulness
regarding compliance." 2 For example, in Gill v. Stolow, the
Second Circuit opined, "in [the] final analysis, a court has the
responsibility to do justice between man and man; and general
principles cannot justify denial of a party's fair day in court ex-
cept upon a serious showing of willful default."" In Gill, the
trial judge entered default judgment against a foreign defen-
dant for failure to come to New York City to be deposed.'
The Second Circuit noted its reluctance to disturb the district
" See infra notes 163-166 and accompanying text.
160 167 U.S. 409 (1897).
161 212 U.S. 322 (1909).
See, e.g., Vindigni v. Meyer, 441 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1971) (reversing dismissal
for evidentiary hearing to determine if plaintiff failed to prosecute suit because his
attorney disappeared and defendants intentionally continued to send all motions,
notices and orders to the attorney rather than plaintiff).
'- 240 F.2d 669, 670 (2d Cir. 1957) (emphasis added); see SEC v. Research
Automation Corp., 521 F.2d 585, 588 (2d Cir. 1975) (court recognizing what it calls
"the policy against a grant of relief by default except in a clear case").
164 240 F.2d at 670.
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court's discretion to properly discipline a party." However,
viewing the record in hindsight, the court concluded that the
assessed penalty was too harsh."6
Nowhere is the Second Circuit's philosophy in this pre-
deterrence era clearer than in its strong statements regarding
willfulness in Flaks v. Koegel." In Flaks, the district court
struck defendants answer and entered default judgment
against the defendant for his failure to appear at a deposi-
tion.' The Second Circuit reversed, finding that the district
court clearly abused its discretion" because it did not con-
sider whether the failure was willful' 70
The Flaks court rejected the plaintiff appellee's arguments
that the 1970 amendments to Rule 37 eliminated the prerequi-
site of willfulness to impose harsh sanctions."' The Supreme
Court had already resolved in Societe Internationale" that
willfulness was a prerequisite to the imposition of a litigation-
ending sanction, and the Second Circuit subscribed to and was
bound by Societe Internationale's holding. The Flaks Court
pointed out that the provisions of Rule 37 had to be read in
light of the Fifth Amendments due process provision because
"there [was] no question but that dismissal of a pleading is the
most drastic sanction provided by the Rule. " "' The foregoing
demonstrates that prior to National Hockey, the Second Circuit
concentrated solely on the individual parties in the case and
strongly disfavored the imposition of severe sanctions. 4
'6 Id.
166 Id. Undoubtedly, such a review of the entire record would today offend the
abuse of discretion standard. Similarly, in another early case, the court held that
compliance with the discovery order obviated the need for a sanction and reversed
a dismissal order. Independent Prods. Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 283 F.2d 730, 732 (2d
Cir. 1960). Here, the court explained its reversal by noting that "[tihe dismisal of
an action with prejudice or the entry of judgment by default are drastic remedies,
and should be applied only in extreme circumstances.e Id. at 733.
17 504 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1974).
13 Id- at 704.
13 Id at 711.
17 Id. at 709 (citing Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et
Comnerciales, SA. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 212 (1958)).
171 I& at 708.
172 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
17 Flaks, 504 F.2d at 708-09.
17 See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 42, at 494 (-Reluctant as we are' has been
the characteristic approach of the judges when wielding their powers under Rule
37.").
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
B. National Hockey and the Ushering in of a New Era of
Sanctions
National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club dra-
matically influenced Second Circuit case law involving discov-
ery sanctions by diminishing the court's hesitation to impose
harsh sanctions.' The circuit unequivocally adopted and ap-
plied National Hockey's holding. In fact, less than three
months after National Hockey, the Second Circuit cited it as
support in Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v.
Inmobiliaria Melia de Puerto Rico, Inc.,7 ' to affirm a
$285,000 default judgment against the defendant for failure to
produce documents and appear for depositions.'77 After fail-
ing to comply with several specific discovery orders, the magis-
trate judge assigned to the case recommended to the district
judge that the defendants be afforded another opportunity to
comply. 7s The district judge rejected the proposal and grant-
ed plaintiffs motion for default judgment under Rule
37(b)(2).'79  Citing National Hockey, the Second Circuit
warned against the tendency18 of a reviewing court to be
heavily influenced by the severity of Rule 37 sanctions, and
held that defendant's willful failure to appear for a deposition
for seven months and its failure to produce documents deemed
readily obtainable justified the sanction imposed by the district
court. 181
427 U.S. 639 (1976). General deterrence is undeniably a purpose of sanction
imposition in the Second Circuit. See, e.g., Envirotech Corp. v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 729 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing National Hockey, 427 U.S. 639, and
recognizing the goal of general deterrence with respect to sanction imposition);
United States Freight Co. v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 716 F.2d 954, 955 (2d Cir.
1983) (same); Litton Sys., Inc. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 700 F.2d
785, 827 (2d Cir. 1983) (same); Lyell Theatre Corp. v. Loews Corp., 682 F.2d 37,
43 (2d Cir. 1982) (same); Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. Playboy Enter., Inc., 663 F.2d
371, 387 (2d Cir. 1981) (same); Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v. Allied Art-
ists Pictures Corp., 602 F.2d 1062, 1066-68 (2d Cir. 1979).
178 543 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1976).
'7 Id. at 4.
178 Id. at 5.
179 Id.
180 This was the Second Circuit's own tendency from Gill v. Stolow, 240 F.2d
669, 670 (2d Cir. 1957).
... Paine, 543 F.2d at 6.
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A landmark case in the Second Circuit, Cine Forty-Second
St. Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., s merits
specific attention. Cine is one of the Second CircuiV's most
influential cases concerning discovery sanctions.' In Cine,
the Second Circuit held, for the first time ever, that "grossly
negligent failure to obey an order compelling discovery may
justify the severest disciplinary measures available under
[Rule] 37."'"4 In Cine, a movie theater charged eleven compet-
itors with antitrust violations, seeking treble damages and an
injunction for alleged anticompetitive practices.' The plain-
tiff failed to respond adequately to defendants' interrogatories.
Plaintiff then failed to obey two subsequent court orders com-
pelling discovery issued by the magistrate judge assigned to
the case.' Cine was assessed $500 in costs for its willful dis-
obedience concerning these two orders, and the court also spe-
cifically warned the plaintiff that any further noncompliance
"would result in dismissal."'
Despite the warning, the plaintiff failed to comply with a
third order that set a specific deadline for compliance."s
Thus, the magistrate judge recommended that Cine be preclud-
ed from introducing evidence with respect to its damages-a
sanction that was tantamount to a dismissal of Cine's damage
claim.ls The district judge agreed that drastic sanctions were
justified for this repeated failure to comply with court discov-
ery orders."0 The district judge, however, did not accept fully
the magistrate's finding of willfulness, and determined that it
16 602 F.2d 1062 (2d Cir. 1979).
* The case has been cited in over 20 Second Circuit discovery sanction cases
since it was decided in 1979. Of all the cases decided in the Second Circuit con-
cerning this issue, Cine has the lengthiest discussion by the court of its policy
with respect to imposing harsh sanctions for discovery abuse. The opinion devotes
three entire pages of discussion to sanction imposition. Id. at 1066-68.
" Id. at 1066 (emphasis added). The First Circuit, on the other hand, dis-
agrees with this holding and requires strict willfulness as opposed to grossly neZli-
gent behavior. See, e.g., Velazquez-Rivera v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 920 F.2d 1072,
1077-79 (1st Cir. 1990) (reversing dismissal despite fact that fault could be found).
Cine, 602 F.2d at 1064.
'Z Id.
187 Id (emphasis added).
1Id.
163 Id. at 1065.
Cine, 602 F.2d at 1065 (The judge wrote, 'If there were ever a case in
which drastic sanctions were justified, this is it?).
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
was inappropriate to impose the extreme sanction recommend-
ed.191 In order to confirm that he correctly perceived the con-
trolling law in the Second Circuit, the district judge certified
an interlocutory appeal to the Second Circuit.'92
The Second Circuit described the purpose of preclusionary
sanctions as threefold: (1) to ensure that a party will not be
able to profit from its own failure to comply;193 (2) to secure
compliance with the particular order at hand (much like a civil
contempt order); and (3) to consider the general deterrent ef-
fect that court orders may have on the instant case and on
other litigation, provided that the party against whom the san-
ction is imposed is at fault."4 The Second Circuit decided
that Rule 37 must be perceived as a credible deterrent rather
than a "paper tiger,"95 and held that grossly negligent
wrongs were fit subjects for general deterrence.'96 The fact
that the abuse was attributable to counsel, and not the client,
did not affect the circuit's holding because the party against
whom the sanction was imposed chose its counsel at its own
peril.197
The stern philosophy underlying the Cine decision remains
a vital force in the Second Circuit regarding the imposition of
harsh sanctions.' The closest it comes to formulating a test
191 Id.
192 Id.
"9 This is a universal maxim of equity that one should never be able to profit
from one's own wrongdoing. See, e.g., Mischalski v. Ford Motor Co., No. 94-CV-
3553, 1996 WL 467170, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 25, 1996) (noting the "widely recog-
nized principle that a person should not be permitted to take advantage of his or
her own wrongdoing by predicating a legal or equitable claim on the person's own
fraudulent, immoral or illegal conduct.")
19 Cine, 602 F.2d at 1066 (citations omitted); see Cady, supra note 18, at 515
(citing Cine for the proposition that the three central purposes of sanctions identi-
fied in the case apply to Rule 37 in general).
193 Cine, 602 F.2d at 1064 (citation omitted).
19 Id. at 1067. Actually the court stated, "IN]egligent, no less than intentional,
wrongs are fit subjects for general deterrence." Id. (citation omitted). However, in
Cine it is clear that the negligence involved was not mere negligence but was
gross negligence. Despite the fact that the opinion in Cine appears to leave the
question open whether ordinary negligence ought to be the subject of harsh, deter-
rent sanctions, no court has endorsed such a view in the Second Circuit.
" Id. at 1068 (citing Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962)).
For further discussion regarding the attorney versus client responsibility for discov-
ery misconduct, see supra Part II.B.3.d and infra Part VI.B.4.
... Cine has been cited in over 60 district and circuit court cases in the Second
Circuit alone. The Bambu court also cited Cine as support for its conclusion that
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concerning the propriety of harsh sanctions is a determination
that fault is the one element that must be found by a district
court prior to implementing a litigation-ending sanction. How-
ever, in the Second Circuit gross negligence constitutes fault.
Thus, the Second Circuit threshold for this ultimate sanction
appears quite low.
Although the Cine opinion mentions the standard phrase-
ology that dismissal and default are the harshest sanctions
that exist,' in actuality it does little to acknowledge the
competing policy interests involved when a suit is dismissed
prior to a trial on its merits. Cine could have addressed the
competing policy concerns associated with discovery sanctions
but failed to do so. The only policy enunciated in Cine relates
to the Circuits refusal to allow pretrial discovery abuse to
"engulf the entire litigative process,""0 and its belief that the
view espoused in the circuit opinion advances the basic purpos-
es of Rule 37.2"1 This policy is undeniably momentous and vi-
tal. Equally important are policies that favor deciding disputes
on their merits and providing litigants with full and fair chanc-
es to have cases heard on their merits. However appropriate or
deserving the sanction imposed in Cine appeared to be, the
tension between these competing policies was too quickly dis-
missed.
C. Sanctions Affirmed and Sanctions Reversed
Since National Hockey and Cine, several Second Circuit
cases have been decided that involved litigation-ending sanc-
tions. In a number of cases, the circuit affirmed the judgments
below imposing litigation-ending sanctions. 2 In several oth-
the district court did not abuse its discretion by granting a default judgment
against the defendants in the case. Bambu Sales, Inc. v. Ozak Trading Inc., 58
F.3d 849, 853 (2d Cir. 1995).
10 Cine, 602 F.2d at 1066.
210 Id at 1064._
2' Id. at 1067.
1 See, e.g., Valentine v. Museum of Modern Art, 29 F.3d 47, 60 (2d Cir. 1994)
(dismissal of action affirmed against plaintiff after repeated and explicit warnings);
Douge v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 899 F.2d 164, 167 (2d Cir. 1990)
(affirming dismissal of plaintiff's action under Tax Court rules by following stan-
dards for dismissal under Rule 37(b)(2), and stating that dismissal was supported
by finding that noncompliance was due to willfulness, bad faith or fault of party
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er cases, an error or abuse of discretion was found, resulting in
either reversal or the cases being remanded to the district
court.2"3 Unfortunately, these cases make it difficult to dis-
for refusal to follow several orders of the court); Minotti v. Lensink, 895 F.2d 100,
103 (2d Cir. 1990) (affirming dismissal against plaintiff for failing to comply with
at least four discovery orders); Sieck v. Russo, 869 F.2d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 1989)
(upholding million dollar default judgments against defendants for repeated refusal
to attend depositions and after milder monetary sanctions already imposed); Mc-
Donald v. Head Criminal Court Supervisor Officer, 850 F.2d 121, 124 (2d Cir.
1988) (dismissing pro se plaintiffs claim for failing to comply with court orders
and responding to request to comply with statement that "the Judge can go to
hel"); Hull v. Waterbury Petroleum Prods., Inc., 845 F.2d 1172, 1177 (2d Cir.
1988) (affirming dismissal against plaintiff after failing to comply with three or-
ders and several warnings that noncompliance would result in dismissal); Update
Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publishing, Ltd,, 843 F.2d 67, 72 (2d Cir. 1988) (affirming
imposition of preclusive sanctions tantamount to dismissal against defendant after
numerous failures to comply with discovery orders); Jones v. Niagara Frontier
Transp. Auth., 836 F.2d 731, 735 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 825 (1987)
(dismissing plaintiffs case for repeated refusal, in the face of several orders, to ap-
pear for and answer questions in a deposition despite advice from counsel); In rc
"Agent Orange" Prod. Liability Litig., 818 F.2d 210, 212 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. de-
nied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988) (dismissing plaintiffs complaint for refusal to completo
deposition); Mone v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 774 F.2d 570, 574 (2d Cir.
1985) (warning taxpayer who failed to comply with order that noncompliance
might lead to dismissal); United States Freight Co. v. Penn Central Transp. Co.,
716 F.2d 954, 954-55 (2d Cir. 1983) (entering default judgment in amount of
$10,000 against defendants for single pretrial violation of discovery order); Lyell
Theatre Corp. v. Loews Corp., 682 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1982) (affirming dismissal
against plaintiff on both Rule 37 and Rule 41(b) grounds); Penthouse Intl, Ltd. v.
Playboy Enter., Inc., 663 F.2d 371, 391 (2d Cir. 1981) (affirming dismissal of
plaintiff complaint for refusal to comply with order to furnish relevant records and
misrepresenting truth regarding whether documents even existed); Chira v.
Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 634 F.2d 664, 667 (2d Cir. 1980) (affirming dismissal
based on failure to prosecute but discussing plaintiffs 37(b) failure as well); Inde-
pendent Investor Protective League v. Touche Ross & Co., 607 F.2d 530, 533-34
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 895 (1978) (affirming dismissal against plaintiffs
because answers to interrogatories were not filed in accordance with court order
and plaintiffs made false statements and gave false testimony regarding timeliness
of service of answers); Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Inmobiliaria Mella
de Puerto Rico, Inc., 543 F.2d 3, 6 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 907 (1976)
(affirming default judgment against defendant who willfully failed to appear for his
deposition for more than seven months and who failed to produce readily obtain-
able records); Ali v. A&G Co., 542 F.2d 595, 596-97 (2d Cir. 1976) (affirming dis-
missal of complaint for failure to appear at trial and other delinquencies). As
would be expected considering the standard of review, more cases can be found in
the Second Circuit since National Hockey affirming litigation-ending sanctions than
reversing the imposition of them.
203 See, e.g., Bobal v. Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst., 916 F.2d 759, 764 (2d Cir.
1990) (stating pro se plaintiff has no right to ignore or violate court order but
must be made aware of the possible consequences of action and that before district
court could impose harsh sanction of dismissal it should have informed plaintiff
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cern any overarching principles or standards regarding the
imposition of litigation-ending sanctions. Except for the re-
quirement that a litigation-ending sanction be imposed only if
fault is found, the reasoning and approaches differ from case to
case.
204
Once a district court finds fault, how it determines wheth-
er the circumstances of the case warrant default or dismissal
varies greatly. A number of different factors, including the
following, are sometimes taken into consideration: (1) the histo-
ry of abuse, including the number of prior orders or warnings
with which a party has failed to comply," (2) the efficacy of
that violation of court order would result in dismissal of case with prejudice); Luft
v. Crown Publishers, Inc., 906 F.2d 862, 866 (2d Cir. 1990) (the court decides that
"in light of the record" the striking of defendant's answer was not supported);
Salahuddin v. Harris, 782 F.2d 1127, 1131-33 (2d Cir. 1986) (action improperly
dismissed because element of willfulness missing and plaintiff did not technically
fail to follow order); DeCrescenzo v. Maersk Container Serv. Co., 741 F.2d 17, 21
(2d Cir. 1984) (holding that despite district court's authority to dismiss case for
failure to comply with discovery orders, the 'extreme" sanction was too drastic in
this case against plaintiff for failing to submit to an examination); Fonseca v.
Regan, 734 F.2d 944, 947-49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 882 (1984) (reversing
dismissal of claim despite claimant's failure to respond to discovery requests be-
cause the information sought was not properly discoverable, so district court could
not impose a Rule 37 sanction for failure to comply with order); Foley v. United
States, 645 F.2d 155, 157 (2d Cir. 1981) (reversing denial of plaintiff's motion to
vacate dismissal because court finds that errors and inefficiencies by plaintifl al-
though they delayed the prosecution of the dispute, did not approach "inexcusable
neglect" to justify denying the motion to vacate); In re Attorney General of the
United States, 596 F.2d 58, 67 (2d Cir. 1979) (writ of mandamus granted because
court abused its discretion in holding party in contempt and not investigating
reasonable alternative sanctions); Israel Aircraft Indus., Ltd. v. Standard Precision,
559 F.2d 203, 208 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that evasive and incorrect answers in
questionnaire not the equivalent of failing to answer or fraud, thus dismissal
against plaintiffs not warranted); Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Research Automa-
tion Corp., 521 F.2d 585, 588-90 (2d Cir. 1975) (defendant did appear for his depo-
sition, and absent a court order default judgment not appropriate under Rule 37(b)
or Rule 37(d)).
"' This is a standard requirement which, if not found, would necessarily re-
quire the circuit to reverse any litigation-ending sanction. See, eg., Simmons v.
Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 88 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that court must find willfulness,
bad faith or fault on the part of the party refusing discovery in order to impose
dismissal or the like as a sanction).
In nearly every case cited supra note 202, the party against whom a litiga-
tion-ending sanction was imposed had refused to comply with more than one court
order. As for the cases with only one violation of a court order, other egregious
circumstances existed. See Jones v. Niagara Frontier Transp. Auth., 836 F.2d 731,
735 (2d Cir. 1987) (plaintiff refused to answer deposition questions despite court
order and advice from his own counsel in a lawsuit that had been pending for
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lesser sanctions; (3) the amount of time involved due to non-
compliance and its resultant delay in the case;... and (4)
whether the party had received prior warnings that future
noncompliance would result in dismissal or default. 7 The
seven years, primarily because of plaintiffs dilatory conduct); In re 'Agent Orange",
818 F.2d at 212 (plaintiff refused to continue deposition despite having been exam-
ined and deemed perfectly capable of so doing and being warned of the conse-
quences for failing to comply); United States Freight Co. v. Penn Central Transp.
Co., 716 F.2d 954, 954-55 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting that "a single pre-trial violation,
such as this party's failure to respond to a document request by the date ordered,
would not ordinarily result in an imposition of a sanction of such finality as ...
entering default judgment," but does here because of party's continuing saga of
dilatory conduct).
20" See Minotti v. Lensink, 895 F.2d 100, 103 (2d Cir. 1987) (failure to heed
four discovery orders delays case two years); Jones, 836 F.2d at 735 (plaintiff
misconduct occurred in context of lawsuit pending for seven years); Lyell Theatre
Corp. v. Loews Corp., 682 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1982) (discovery not complete ten years
after action instituted and thus dismissed for failure to prosecute).
207 This holds particularly true for pro se plaintiffs. See, e.g., Valentine v. Muse-
um of Modern Art, 29 F.3d 47, 48-49 (2d Cir. 1994) (affirming dismissal, for re-
peated failure to comply with orders despite being directly warned on at least four
separate occasions that failure to comply would result in dismissal); Bobal, 916
F.2d at 761 ("[W]e conclude that the district court abused its discretion by dis-
missing with prejudice ... without first warning this pro se plaintiff that such a
harsh sanction was in the offing."). However, it holds equally true even if the
party involved is not pro se. When the plaintiff is the party failing to comply with
court orders, failure to prosecute is also a basis upon which a court justifies dis-
missal of an action. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b), which permits involuntary dismissal
of a plaintiffs claim by a court "[flor failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or comply
with these rules or any order of court[;] a defendant may move for dismissal of an
action or of any claim against the defendant.. . ." Several dismissal cases in the
Second Circuit discuss Rule 41(b) in addition to Rule 37(b)(2). See, e.g.,
Mackensworth v. S.S. American Merchant, 28 F.3d 246, 253 (2d Cir. 1994) ("Dis-
missal of a claim may, of course, be an appropriate sanction for failure to prose-
cute a claim or failure to comply with discovery orders."); Harding v. Federal Re-
serve Bank of New York, 707 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1983); Lyell Theatre, 682 F.2d at
41-42 (affirming dismissal of case in accordance with Rule 41(b), but indicating in
dicta that delinquencies in case may well have provided sufficient basis for imposi-
tion of dismissal under Rule 37(b)(2)); Chira v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 634 F.2d
664, 667 (2d Cir. 1980) (dismissal appropriate not only for plaintiffs failure to
comply with a discovery order, but for his failure to prosecute case at all). But see
Salahuddin v. Harris, 782 F.2d 1127, 1134 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing Societe
Internationale, holding that whether a court has the power to dismiss a complaint
because of failure to comply with a discovery order depends exclusively on Rule 37,
so "there is no need to resort to Rule 41(b)"). The holding in Salahuddin should
apply with equal force to a court's inherent power to sanction. See generally Adam
Behar, Note, The Misuse of Inherent Powers When Imposing Sanctions for Discov-
ery Abuse: The Exclusivity of Rule 37, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 1779 (1988); see also
Maurice Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrial Discovery, 58 COLUM. L. REV.
480, 483-86 (1958) (arguing that there is no justification for a court to bypass
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circumstances which appear to be particularly persuasive in
the Second Circuit are the history of abuse and whether the
party against whom the sanction is being imposed had been
warned that such a sanction might be imposed."s
One might be tempted to conclude that because some of
the above factors are generally considered by the Second
Circuit district courts, no formal test is needed." Such a
conclusion is not warranted. Even though some courts do con-
sider similar factors when deciding the propriety of litigation-
ending sanctions, the Second Circuit does not require that any
of these factors be considered. Not surprisingly, then, no sped-
fled set of factors is examined with any regularity or consis-
tency among Second Circuit courts. Whether a litigation-end-
ing sanction is imposed depends almost entirely upon the
judge. Therefore, cases either affirming or reversing the impo-
sition of litigation-ending sanctions do not indicate what cir-
cumstances the courts will consider. Rather, they only illumi-
nate the Second Circuit's policy concerning discovery abuse
and discovery sanctions.
Since Cine, the Second Circuit has repeatedly pronounced,
in rather strong terms, that failure to comply with discovery
orders is intolerable. For instance, in Sieck v. Russo,"' a one
million dollar default judgment was entered against defen-
dants for repeatedly failing to appear for scheduled deposi-
Rule 37 and that discovery should be enforced exclusively by Rule 37); Rebecca
Gandolfi Moore, Comment, Chambers v. Nasco, Inc.-Judicial Dircipline Wields a
Big Stick, 37 LOY. L. REV. 1043 (1992) (discussing Supreme Court decision which
held that a federal court has inherent power to impose as sanctions the entire
amount of the opposing party's fees).
I However paternalistic one may think this is, the fact remains that in the
majority of cases affirming litigation-ending sanctions in the Second Circuit, the
party against whom the sanction is imposed was warned prior to imposition that
failure to comply with the order in question may (or would) lead to dismissal,
default or the like. As discussed infra Part IV.B and accompanying text, there was
no prior warning in Bambu that a default judgment might be entered for failure
to comply with the order that was the subject of the litigation-ending sanction.
11 Certainly, a majority of the important factors to consider appear to be con-
sidered by Second Circuit courts. However, as discussed in greater detail infra pp.
648-53, greater consistency is desirable with respect to the most drastic of sanc-
tions, and would promote the purposes underlying their imposition. Even if the
decisions to impose litigation-ending sanctions to date are appropriate under the
circumstances in each case, the net result is that litigants and judges still have no
measure or yardstick to guide them.
210 869 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1989).
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tions. The recalcitrant parties had already been sanctioned
monetarily for their noncompliance prior to the entry of de-
fault.2 "' However, on appeal, the defendants argued that the
district court abused its discretion because softer sanctions
were available. The court sarcastically responded to this argu-
ment by stating:
Apparently, defendants perceive that the function of a reviewing
court is to search, like Goldilocks, for a sanction that is not too hard,
not too soft, but one that is just right. We, however, prefer to play
the other role in that story, and provide the teeth to enforce discov-
ery orders by leaving it to the district court to determine which
sanction from among the available range is appropriate.212
Similarly, in Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publishing,
Ltd.,21 3 sanctions of approximately $475,000 were imposed
against defendants, thereby awarding plaintiffs summary judg-
ment on its copyright infringement claim. The circuit asserted
that the issue in the case was whether it intended to strictly
enforce sanctions for discovery noncompliance, and stated that
the case was a stern warning that it did. 4 The Second Cir-
cuit noted that the defendants had violated a series of court
orders and were repeatedly warned that sanctions would be
imposed if they continued their noncompliance." 5 It therefore
held that the case fell far short of one in which the magistrate
judge abused her discretion in imposing a sanction, and her
decision was unconditionally warranted.26 The Second Cir-
cuit summarized its position with the following forceful state-
ments regarding its policy of strict compliance with discovery
orders:
In holding as we do, we wish to emphasize the importance we place
on a party's compliance with discovery drders. Such compliance is
necessary to the integrity of our judicial process. A party who flouts
discovery orders does so at his peril. If one suggests that our deci-
sion today is strong medicine, that is precisely what it is intended to
be. 2
17
211 Id. at 134.
212 Id.
2" 843 F.2d 67, 68 (2d Cir. 1988).
214 Id.
215 Id. at 70.
210 Id. at 72.
217 Id. at 73.
[Vol. 62: 585
19961 LITIGATIONENDING SANCTIONS FOR DISCOVERYABUSE 625
A particularly strict application of this policy can be found
in United States Freight Co. v. Penn Central Transportation
Co.2" Here, although plaintiffs agreed to settle for lost or
damaged shipments and defendants' counsel agreed to recom-
mend the settlement figure to his clients, the defendants re-
fused to settle.2' The district court had to vacate its prior
dismissal, entered on the belief that the parties had settled.
The magistrate judge then ordered that discovery continue and
be completed by a certain date. Defendants failed to comply
with this order."' The court acknowledged that ordinarily a
single pretrial violation does not result in the imposition of
default judgment."9 However, the imposition of default was
affirmed based on the defendants' "continuing saga of dilatory
conduct." ' The defendants' dilatory conduct included imped-
ing and extending court proceedings by seeking three exten-
sions before answering the complaint, and engaging the court
in four pretrial conferences on the belief that the parties would
complete settlement, which they never did.' The Second
Circuit held that the unconditional sanction imposition was
necessary to deter other parties from ignoring discovery or-
ders.'2
Although not as common, there are also cases in the Sec-
ond Circuit since National Hockey and Cine reversing the im-
position of litigation-ending sanctions. In these cases, the Sec-
ond Circuit either explicitly found that the district court
abused its discretion ' or, acknowledging the abuse of discre-
tion standard, found that the district court did not see the
facts of the case in the "proper light."' 8 For example, in Luft
2- 716 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1983).
20 Id at 954.
= Id
' Id But see infra note 304 and accompanying text.
'> Penn Central, 716 F.2d at 955.
2 Id. at 954-55.
2' Id. at 955.
1' See, e.g., Bobal v. Renssleaer Polytechnic Inst., 916 F.2d 759, 761 (2d Cir.
1990). Here, the court held that the district court abused its discretion by dismiss-
ing with prejudice part of the pro se plaintiffs suit without first warning that
such a harsh sanction was in the offing; see also In re Attorney General of the
United States, 596 F.2d 58, 67 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding district court abused discre-
tion by not investigating more thoroughly reasonable alternative sanctions to con-
tempt for party's failure to disclose certain files).
See infra notes 227-230 and accompanying text. A strong argument can be
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v. Crown Publishers, Inc., 227 the Second Circuit found that
the district court failed to find the extent of defendants' non-
compliance with discovery orders sufficient to justify striking
defendants' answer. The court acknowledged that several of
the defendants' arguments intended to challenge the district
court's exercise of discretion were meritless.2' Nonetheless,
the Second Circuit held that the district court's decision did
not "in light of the record" support the imposition of sanc-
tions.2  Thus, the Second Circuit remanded the case for fur-
ther findings regarding compliance with the order.23
D. Summary of Second Circuit Law Just Prior to Bambu
Seminal cases like Cine are the exception, not the rule.
Undoubtedly, because of the nature of the abuse of discretion
standard of review, the majority of Second Circuit cases con-
cerning the imposition of litigation-ending sanctions does not
include lengthy discussions concerning policy implications or
considerations."1 Most cases contain standard language re-
garding the harshness of the -sanction and whether the district
court judge concluded that the particular circumstances justi-
made that in several cases in which the imposition of a litigation-ending sanction
has been reversed by the Second Circuit, the court did not follow the abuse of
discretion standard in so doing. Save for making a finding that the party against
whom sanctions were imposed did not act in bad faith or with fault (itself a diffi-
cult finding on appeal unless the factual determination by the trial judge is clearly
erroneous), there is no basis for the reviewing court to overturn a decision below.
The Second Circuit does not have a pronounced method of determining the propri-
ety of imposing these types of sanctions. Thus, unless the appellate court deter-
mines that the noncompliance was without fault, there would appear to be no
justification for overturning a decision by the district court.
22' 906 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1990).
' Id. at 866. For instance, the court rejected the argument (as did the district
court) that discovery was not directed toward one of the defendants. In addition,
the court agreed with the district court that the failure to comply was willful or
culpable.
22 Id. at 866-67.
Id. Likewise, in DeCrescenzo v. Maersk Container Serv. Co., 741 F.2d 17, 18
(2d Cir. 1984), the court acknowledged that the district court has the authority to
dismiss a case for failure to comply with discovery orders, but stated that "the
extreme sanction of dismissal is too drastic .... "
2"1 This Note focuses on Second Circuit cases. Admittedly, it is the district
courts that are really delving into the imposition of litigation-ending sanctions.
However, any policy or direction with regard to imposing harsh sanctions must
come from the Second Circuit itself, not its district courts.
[Vol. 62: 585
1996] LITIGATION-ENDING SANCTIONS FOR DISCOVERYABUSE 627
fled the imposition of the sanction. However, unlike the Third,
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits,'  district
courts in the Second Circuit are not required to consider fixed
standards when imposing litigation-ending sanctions.
As in every other circuit, there are cases both affirming
and reversing the imposition of litigation-ending sanctions in
the Second Circuit. What stands out is the Second Circuit's
decisions in cases such as Cine, Sieck, Update Art and the like.
These cases represent the Second Circuit's explicit position
that discovery orders must be followed. Moreover, the National
Hockey deterrence goal is a driving force behind sanction impo-
sition in the Second Circuit. What makes the cases difficult to
reconcile is the manner in which sanctions are imposed. The
inconsistency in approach and result belies the goal stated by
the Second Circuit regarding compliance with discovery orders.
However unyielding the Second Circuit holds itself out to be,
many judges actually have a rather paternalistic approach to
litigation-ending sanctions. In several instances, Second Cir-
cuit courts do not impose litigation-ending sanctions against a
recusant party unless the party has: (1) been warned of the
possibility; (2) failed to comply with several orders; or (3) been
given a specific and clear deadline for compliance.'
232 See supra notes 103-108.
"s See, e.g., Valentine v. Museum of Modem Art, 29 F.3d 47, 48-49 (2d Cir.
1994) (prior to dismissal, pro se plaintiff "repeatedly warned" of sanctions that
could be imposed if he refused to comply with orders, and the court informed
plaintiff after several transgressions that if he failed to appear for a depozition his
case would be dismissed); Thomas E. Hoar, Inc. v. Sam Lee Corp., 900 F.2d 522,
524 (2d Cir. 1990) (plaintiff violated several court orders; a deadline was set for
compliance with another order and party was warned that failure to comply would
result in automatic affirmation of magistrate judges earlier order recommending
preclusion of evidence at trial); Minotti v. Lensink, 895 F.2d 100, 102 (2d Cir.
1990) (affrming dismissal for plaintiffs failure to comply with order that set dead-
line and warned that case would be dismissed for failure to comply); Sieck v.
Russo, 869 F.2d 131, 133 (2d Cir. 1989) (default judgment entered against party
who failed to comply with initial order and then failed to comply with order sped-
fying a date for appearance and warning that failure to appear would result in a
default judgment); John B. Hull, Inc. v. Waterbury Petroleum Prods., Inc., 845
F.2d 1172, 1175 (2d Cir. 1988) (recalcitrant party warned twice that failure to
comply with order would result in action's dismissal); Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin
Publishing, Ltd., 843 F.2d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 1988) (sanction imposed after series of
court orders is not followed and party repeatedly warned that sanctions would be
imposed for continued noncompliance); Jones v. Niagara Frontier Transp. Auth.,
836 F.2d 731, 733 (2d Cir. 1987) (dismissal based on order specifying deadline for
compliance and party was warned by both the court and counsel to comply); Mone
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It is against this judicial philosophy and approach-a
tough but somewhat "nurturing" approach-that the Bambu
case collides. On one hand, the default judgment entered
against the defendants in Bambu, after failure to comply with
a single discovery order, certainly embodies the circuit's stated
goal with respect to "strong medicine." However, in light of
Second Circuit precedent, the Bambu court may have gone too
far, and the default judgment entered may have been too
harsh under the circumstances. Certainly the bigger issue is
how Bambu and cases in the future can be reconciled with past
precedents in the Second Circuit. The Bambu case is signifi-
cant, therefore, for two reasons. First, it represents a some-
what stark departure from other cases involving litigation-
ending sanctions in the Second Circuit. Even though the defen-
dants' conduct in the Bambu case warranted some type of
remedial action by the court, default appears too harsh a sanc-
tion under the circumstances. Seconid, and more importantly,
the case epitomizes the flaws in the Second Circuit's approach
to litigation-ending sanctions and underscores the desirability
for greater uniformity. The Bambu case is a prime example of
why a more cohesive approach to imposing litigation-ending
sanctions is desirable.23
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 774 F.2d 570, 572 (2d Cir. 1985) (dismissal
was preceded by explicit warning that failure to comply with order might lead to
dismissal); Independent Investor Protective League v. Touche Ross & Co., 607 F.2d
530, 533-34 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 895 (1978) (affirming dismissal against
plaintiffs and counsel for failure to comply with an order requiring service of an-
swers to interrogatories by a specified date); see also National Hockey League v.
Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 641 (1976) ("This action was taken
in the face of warnings that their failure to provide certain information could
result in the imposition of sanctions . . .).
' Obviously, the decision to impose sanctions for discovery abuse in any case
is predominantly a fact specific inquiry. The opinions dealing with these cases do
not, indeed cannot, make the factual record come alive because it is usually rather
long and detailed. What follows in Part IV is a detailed account of what tran-
spired in the Bambu case in an effort to illustrate how the entire sanctioning pro-
cess appears to operate.
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IV. BAMBU SALES V. OzAK TRADING-AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS
OF SECOND CIRCUIT LITIGATION-ENDING SANCTION CASE
Most notable about litigation-ending sanction cases in the
Second Circuit is not what they do say, but rather what they
do not say. Second Circuit opinions involving discovery sanc-
tions generally tend to be short, straightforward and terse.
The court usually mentions the severity or drastic nature of
the sanction, the appropriate standard of review and then
proceeds to affirm or reverse without expanding on the policies
or particular facts that prompted the decision.' The report-
ed Bambu decision is no exception.'3 However, a closer ex-
amination of the record in Bambu provides greater insight into
the Second Circuit's approach to imposing litigation-ending
sanctions. What emerges from this analysis is that the current
approach has weaknesses.
A. Bambu-Background and Chronology Leading Up to the
Motion to Compel
On March 2, 1990, Bambu Sales, Inc.' ("Bambu") filed
suit in the Southern District of New York against Ozak Trad-
ing Company ("Ozak") and its president, Doron Gratch, for al-
The Second Circuit is not alone with respect to terse opinions. See, eg.,
Muzakkir v. Villasenor, 65 F.3d 175 (9th Cir. 1995) (affirming dismissal of discv-
ery sanction in one and a half page opinion); United States v. A&P Arora, Ltd.,
46 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir. 1995) (affirming default sanction based on district judge's
memorandum). Understandably, however, some cases on appeal do not include
lengthy discussions probably because the opinions below thoroughly address all of
the important factors and considerations.
Of course, this is not always the case. In Cine Forty-Second Street Theatre
Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 602 F.2d 1062 (2d Cir. 1979), the Court
engaged in a lengthy policy discussion regarding its decision and its holding con-
cerning the level of culpability necessary for the imposition of litigation-ending
sanctions. However, due in part to the abuse of discretion standard of review, the
majority of cases dealing with this issue offer only conclusory statements and
provide little in the way of guidance from a policy perspective as to why the
choice to impose litigation-ending sanctions is fair and appropriate or not.
Bambu Sales, Inc. v. Ozak Trading Co., Inc., 58 F.3d 849 (2d Cir. 1995).
The only portion of the Bambu decision that deals with the propriety of the sanc-
tion imposed is one paragraph long, the majority of which is citations to other
cases. Id at 853-54.
1 Bambu Sales, Inc. is a company that imports and sells cigarette rolling pa-
per under a federally registered trademark Id. at 850.
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leged trademark infringement. " Bambu sought, inter alia, a
preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining Ozak from
using Bambu's trademark in connection with the sale of any
unauthorized goods, as well as damages and costs for the irrep-
arable harm Bambu claimed it had suffered."' On April 5,
1990, Ozak answered the complaint by denying every allega-
tion, asserting three affirmative defenses and setting forth its
own counterclaims."
Shortly before Ozak filed its answer and counterclaims,
Bambu moved for expedited discovery. The district judge held
a conference on March 8, 1990, and granted Bambu's mo-
tion. 2 Discovery then commenced. The plaintiff served two
sets of interrogatories and requests for production of docu-
ments on the defendants. 3 The defendants responded to
each discovery request.' In addition, Ozak's president,
' Plaintiffs Amended Complaint at 5, Bambu Sales, Inc. v. Ozak Trading, Inc.,
58 F.3d 849 (2d Cir. 1995) (No. 93-7913). The complaint averred that Ozak Trad-
ing Co. had used the Bambu trade name on lightweight cigarette paper that was
being sold improperly in the United States. The complaint also alleged violations
of the Trademark Act of 1946 and of New York common law relating to trade-
mark infringement and unfair competition. Id at 6-7. Bambu had discontinued the
sale of its lightweight cigarette paper in the United States, but permitted its for-
eign manufacturer to sell it on the condition that it be sold only to a Nigerian
buyer. Bambu, 58 F.3d at 851. Apparently, Ozak was in the chain of distribution
that brought some of the Bambu cigarette paper back into the United States. Id.
240 Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint at 9-10, Bambu, (No. 93-7913). Plaintiffs also
sought to enjoin Ozak Trading Co. from competing unfairly and from using any
reproduction or colorable imitation of its trademark. Id. at 6-8, 10.
241 Defendants' Answer and Counterclaims. Ozak Trading Co. imports and dis-
tributes brand-name goods as well as "off brand-name" goods and "closeouts."
Bambu, 58 F.3d at 850; Defendants' Answer and Counterclaims at 3, 4-11. One of
Ozak's major claims against Bambu was that it had notified Ozak's customers,
and/or prospective customers, that Ozak's products were counterfeit or illegal. Ozak
claimed these actions caused it irreparable harm and injury. Defendants' Answer
and Counterclaims at 9.
24 Record at 2, 10, Bambu Sales, Inc. v. Ozak Trading, Inc., No. 90 Civ. 1426
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 1990). However, there was a caveat to the granting of the mo-
tion. Expedited discovery would be allowed only with the understanding that the
plaintiff not be permitted to bother any Ozak customers. Id. at 9-11. The order
dated March 19, 1990 required defendant to produce documents from "January 1,
1989 to date regarding the purchase, importation, or sale of cigarette paper bear-
ing the Bambu trademark," and to produce Doron Gratch, Ozak's president, for a
deposition on March 14, 1990. Bambu, Civ. No. 90-1426 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1990).
24 See Plaintiffs First Request for Production of Documents and Things to
Defendant, Mar. 19, 1990; Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories to Defendant
(undated); Plaintiffs Second Request for Production of Documents, Jan. 29, 1991;
Plaintiffs Second Set of Interrogatories, Feb. 15, 1991.
24 See Defendants' Response to First Request for Production of Documents and
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Doron Gratch, was deposed a number of times." 5 Apparently,
the plaintiff encountered difficulties deposing Gratch in that he
refused to answer a number of questions,2 46 and his attorney
Things, May 18, 1990; Defendants' Response to First Set of Interrogatories, May
18, 1990. Ozak responded rather briefly to the plaintiff's second discovery request.
Apparently Bambu wanted Ozak to produce copies of certain documents, and Ozak
wanted the plaintiff to inspect the documents at the defendants' attorney's office.
See Defendants' Response to Second Set of Interrogatories, Mar. 12, 1991;
Defendants' Response to Second Request for Production of Documents and Things,
Mar. 15, 1991. Local Rule 46 in the Southern District of New York does not set a
deadline for a response to an interrogatory request. Presumably, Ozak's May 18,
1990 response can be considered timely in accordance with local rules. MCKn -,E's
NEW YORK RULES OF COURT, STATE AND FEDERAL, Southern & Emstern Districts
Civil Rules, Rule 46, at 766-67 (West 1995). But see FED. R. CIV. P. 34() ('The
party upon whom the request is served shall serve a written response within 30
days after the service of the request .... "). The responses were clearly untimely
in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
24 Actually, Gratch was deposed three times in this case before a default judg-
ment was entered against the defendants-on March 14, 1990, February 6, 1991,
and February 5, 1992. Brief for Defendants at 6, Bambu, 58 F.3d 849 (2d Cir.
1995) (No. 93-7913) [hereinafter Brief for Defendants]. Ironically, the third deposi-
tion took place approximately two weeks prior to the magistrate judge's recom-
mendation that default judgment be entered. In her report, the magistrate judge
stated that "[lilt does not appear from the papers on file that [the] deposition [of
Gratch] ever took place." Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation at 6 n.6,
Bambu Sales, Inc. v. Ozak Trading, Inc., No. 89 Civ. 1426 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18,
1992) (No. 89-1426) [hereinafter Report and Recommendation].
2,I For instance, the parties agreed that Gratch's second deposition, scheduled
for 2:00 p.m. on February 6, 1991, would go into the evening hours. Memo from
Defendant's Counsel to H. Pitman, Jan. 23, 1991. In its brief argued before the
Second Circuit, however, plaintiff claimed that Gratch and his counsel 'unilaterally
terminated the deposition at 6:10 p.m. and refused to answer numerous questions
on the ground of relevance." Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 7-8, Bambu, 58 F.3d
849 (2d Cir. 1995) (No. 93-7913) [hereinafter Brief for Plaintiffl. Another example
of inappropriate behavior during the February 6, 1991 deposition follows:
Q: Who provided you with the goods that were the subject matter of the
[TIC-TAC] lawsuit [a separate lawsuit involving Ozaki?
A: None of your business, sir.
[DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL]: You don't have to answer that question.
A. I am not going to answer, I am not going to deal with this fucking
thing.
Q: Who provided you with the articles that are the subject matter of
that lawsuit?
[DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL]: That is not relevant to this case at alL rm
going to instruct the witness not to answer.
Id at 8. A deponent's use of such an expletive can hardly be considered "appropri-
ate" behavior. However, it certainly seems that the deponent in the Bambu case
was emboldened to respond in such a manner by the direction given to him from
his counsel that he need not answer the question posed. In light of the instruction
by counsel, the deponents belligerent attitude is understandable to some degree.
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directed him not to respond to questions based solely on rele-
vance. 7 The district court, however, was not aware of these
difficulties until June 5, 1991, when the plaintiff moved to
compel discovery."5
Shortly after discovery commenced, the district judge re-
ferred the case to a magistrate judge for pre-trial settlement
and supervision." During a May 30, 1990, pretrial confer-
ence, the magistrate judge set September 28, 1990, as the dis-
covery deadline.' 0 The parties were ordered to submit a let-
ter to the magistrate judge by June 25, 1990, outlining discov-
ery progress and matters still in dispute.251 The parties joint-
ly applied to extend the discovery deadline. The magistrate
judge granted the application and extended the deadline to
The deponent was obviously led by his counsel to believe that the line of question-
ing being pursued by opposing counsel was inappropriate. Thus, the deponent
responded accordingly, even if too brusquely. Strangely, plaintiff's counsel did not
move to compel the deponent to answer any questions during the deposition or
right after it was terminated.
247 During a deposition, "a party may instruct a deponent not to answer only
when necessary to preserve a privilege." FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d)(1).
'" It is curious that plaintiff's counsel did nothing with respect to this behavior
at the time it occurred. A potent argument could be made that plaintiffs counsel
acted inappropriately as well as defendants' counsel. He had a duty to his own
client to ensure that all necessary information was being obtained, and he certain-
ly could have and should have moved to compel the deponent at the time this
incident occurred. See All v. A&G Co., 542 F.2d 595, 596 (2d Cir. 1976) ("Under
Rule 37 . . . it was appellants' responsibility to raise the defendants' lack of coop-
eration in discovery .... Had a timely motion been made, the court might have
entered an appropriate order against the defendants.. . ."). One wonders whether
the information being requested by the plaintiffs was truly necessary if opposing
counsel so easily gave up the "fight" to obtain the information. One of the primary
reasons the magistrate judge in the Bambu case chose default judgment as op-
posed to a lesser sanction was her determination that information improperly
withheld by the defendants was sought by plaintiff to prove its case, and that any
sanction short of default would "permit the recalcitrant parties to benefit from
their tactical obstruction ... ." Report and Recommendation at 14, Bambu (No.
89-1426). For an interesting commentary on attorney misconduct with respect to
discovery by a partner in a Tennessee law firm, see Donald F. Paine, Sanctions
for Discovery Abuse, TENN. BAR J., NoviDec. 1991, at 19 ("Have you ever
'instructed' a witness not to answer a deposition question? I have, and I was flat
wrong."); see also Ward Wagner, Jr. & Helen Wagner McAfee, Combatting Discov.
ery Abuse, 14 TRIAL DIPL. J., Winter 1992, at 197, 198-99 (warning practitioners
not to wait when discovery abuse occurs because to maximize results with the
judge, "you want the judge to follow along with the course of discovery").
2" Report and Recommendation at 1, Bambu (No. 89-1426) (case was referred
on April 26, 1990).
20 Id. at 2.
21 Id.
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December 28, 1990.2 Shortly after the December 1990 dead-
line passed, with discovery incomplete, the magistrate judge
transferred the case back to the district judge for trial."
The case was returned to the magistrate judge on Febru-
ary 20, 1991 for settlement.' The district judge orally direct-
ed the parties to complete discovery by March 28, 1991,=
and scheduled a settlement conference for April 3, 1991.'
On March 26, 1991, defendants' attorney submitted a request
for a thirty-day extension in order to depose one of plaintiff's
officers. 7 At this point, after two deadlines for discovery
completion already had passed, Bambu's attorney responded by
"reciting various outstanding discovery requests to defendants,
including the failure of defendant Gratch to appear for the con-
clusion of his deposition."' Meanwhile, defendants' counsel
requested that the April 3, 1991 settlement conference be re-
scheduled. 9 The magistrate judge denied the request and
ordered the parties to appear on that date. Defendants'
counsel failed to appear April 3, 1991, and offered no explana-
tion or excuse for this failure.2"' A settlement conference was
I Id- It is curious that so little is made of this point by the magistrate judge
in her report and recommendation. Part of the reason that a default judgment was
recommended and entered in this case was the purported evasive and dilatory
tactics by the defendants. However, the plaintiff did not once make a motion to
the magistrate judge during the initial period in which discovery was to be com-
pleted. Furthermore, the parties jointly applied for an extension of the discovery
deadline.
Id. at 2-3. The magistrate judge noted in her report and recommendation
that neither party had applied to her to settle any outstanding disputes. Id. at 2.
Report and Recommendation at 3, Bambu (No. 89-1426).
2-1 Again, the record does not indicate that the desire to extend the deadline
was not mutual, or that either party was experiencing any problems with respect
to discovery.
21 Report and Recommendation at 3, Bambu (No. 89-1426).
2M Id.
258 I&.
Id at 3-4.
I& at 4.
261 Report and Recommendation at 4 & n4. This failure to appear or show
cause for such failure is not mentioned by the district judge in her decision to
enter a default judgment, see Bambu Sales Inc. v. Ozak Trading, Inc., No. 90 Civ.
1426 (S.D.N.Y. May 15, 1992), or by the Second Circuit in its opinion in this case.
See Bambu, 58 F.3d 849 (2d Cir. 1995). Although not cited as such in the report
and recommendation, one cannot help but think that this dereliction of counsel's
duty played a larger role in the magistrate judge's decision to recommend entry of
default. Prior to the scheduled conference, it appeared that both parties were to
blame for the fact that discovery was not yet complete. Plaintiff had complaints
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held on May 22, 1991, and the magistrate judge set a schedule
for the outstanding discovery disputes "since it appeared that
counsel were unable or unwilling to comply with [her] direc-
tions regarding informal resolution of discovery disputes."262
B. Motion to Compel Discovery and Motion for Default
Judgment
On June 5, 1991, plaintiffs counsel moved for an order
pursuant to Rule 37 to compel the defendants to produce cer-
tain documents and to produce Doron Gratch to complete his
deposition."6 ' Defendants responded to this motion on June
12, 1991, arguing that Gratch should not have been compelled
to attend a third deposition because the plaintiff had refused to
produce a Bambu officer for a deposition for over a year.2"'
Moreover, defendants alleged the following: (1) that all rele-
vant documents relating to the purchase or acquisition of
Bambu-branded products had already been produced;26 (2)
that plaintiffs counsel had violated the district judge's March
19, 1990 order regarding contact with Ozak customers;2 66 (3)
that the information requested with respect to an unrelated
lawsuit was to harass defendants;267 and (4) that identifica-
tion of privileged materials in that file would be too burden-
regarding noncompliance, which he ultimately brought forward in a motion to
compel. But the record reveals that the defendants complained of noncompliance as
well-namely, that defendants were not permitted to depose certain plaintiff offi-
cers in this matter. Defendants' eventual motion to compel was summarily rejected
by the magistrate judge because of a procedural, rather than substantive, error.
See Magistrate's Endorsed Memorandum, Feb. 18, 1992 (denying defendants motion
to compel on grounds that the representations of fact on which it was based were
not included in an affidavit or declaration under penalty of perjury).
26 Report and Recommendation at 4. Interestingly, this comment was addressed
to counsel for both parties.
26" Notice of Motion by Attorneys for Plaintiff, June 5, 1991; see supra notes
245-248 and accompanying text.
26 Response to Application by Plaintiff Bambu Sales, Inc. for Further Discovery
at 1, June 12, 1991 [hereinafter Defendants' Response to Motion to Compel]. Curi-
ously, the defendant refers to plaintiffs motion as a "request" for the third deposi-
tion of Gratch. Nowhere in this response did defendants concede or even acknowl-
edge that the deposition had not been deemed completed by plaintiff.
20 Id.
26 Id. at 2-3.
26 Id. at 4-5.
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some to produce.' Finally, defendants requested that plain-
tiff reply to defendants' alleged "interrogatories and notice of
deposition that had been outstanding for over a year.' The
magistrate judge granted the plaintiffs motion to compel in its
entirety and rejected defense counsel's self-help explanations
for its actionsY0 The August 30, 1991 court order, memo-
263 Id. at 7-8.
26 Defendants' Response to Motion to Compel at 9, June 12, 1991. Nothing in
the record supports this contention.
27 The magistrate judge issued an endorsed memorandum on August 30, 1991.
It reads, in pertinent part:
Plaintiffs motion is granted in all respects, provided that plaintiff shall
promptly reimburse defendant for the reasonable expenses of photocopy-
ing documents. Compliance with local Civil Rule 46 is not optional. A
deponent may not refuse to answer a question on grounds other than
privilege. [Defendants' allegations that plaintiff has violated the March
1990 order with respect to customer contact is] not a legally sufficient
basis for refusing to respond to relevant discovery requests.
Magistrate's Endorsed Memorandum, Aug. 30, 1991. Civil Rule 46 in the Southern
District of New York reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
(e)(1) Where an objection is made to any interrogatory or sub-part thereof
or to any document request under Fed. I. Civ. P. 34, the objection shall
state with specificity all grounds. Any ground not stated ... shall be
waived.
(2) Where a claim of privilege is asserted in objecting to any interrogato-
ry or document demand... and an answer is not provided on the basis
of such assertion,
(i) the attorney asserting the privilege shall... identify the nature
of the privilege ... ; and
(ii) the following information shall be provided in the objection, un-
less divulgence of such information would cause disclosure of the alleged-
ly privileged information:
(A) for documents: (1) the type of document; (2) general subject matter of
the document; (3) the date of the document; (4) such other information as
is sufficient to identify the document... [such as] the author.., the
addressee... the relationship of the author and addressee to each other
S.D.N.Y. Civ. R. 46 (McKinney 1996) (emphasis added). The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure authorize district courts to make and amend rules governing procedure
provided that any local rules implemented by the district court are not "inconsis-
tent with [the federal] rules." FED. R. Civ. P. 83. A great deal of controversy in
recent years has developed with respect to implementing local rules because the
term "inconsistent" is ambiguous. A major issue facing courts today regarding
inconsistent approaches with respect to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure con-
cerns the 1993 Amendments to Rule 26 and automatic disclosure. Because manda-
tory disclosure is optional, critics argue that it has led to a balkanization of the
system. For a recent discussion on civil disclosure and the skepticism it has en-
gendered since Rule 26 was amended in 1993, see Ron Coleman, Civil Disclosure,
A.B.A. J., Oct. 1995, at 76; see also William 0. Bertelsman, The 1994 Annual
Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools: Changing the Rules of Pretri-
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rializing the magistrate judge's determination, contained no
warning of sanctions contemplated by the magistrate judge for
failure to comply and did not specify a deadline for compli-
ance.
271
On September 27, 1991, plaintiffs counsel notified the
defendants that because they had not complied with the Au-
gust 1991 order, plaintiff would move for entry of a default
judgment pursuant to Rule 37.272 On November 5, 1991,
defendants' counsel submitted its opposition to the motion for
default judgment accompanied by an affirmation from
defendants' attorney, Gerard Dunne. In the affirmation, Dunne
alleged that he was not able to meet with Gratch (or presum-
ably any officer of Gratch's company) to arrange for his contin-
ued deposition and the production of documents until late
October 1991 because Gratch was seriously ill. 3
C. Magistrate Judge's Report & Recommendation Leading to
District Court Entry of Default Judgment
The magistrate judge assigned to the case issued a
lengthy, sixteen-page memorandum in support of her recom-
mendation that plaintiffs motion for default judgment pursu-
ant to Rule 37(b)(2)(c) should be granted.2 74 After setting out
the facts in some detail,S. the magistrate judge described the
purpose of sanctions and the "standard" to be followed in im-
posing sanctions. The magistrate judge identified three purpos-
es of Rule 37 sanctions with respect to failing to follow a dis-
covery order: (1) to ensure a party will not benefit from its own
failure to comply; (2) to be a specific deterrent and seek to
al Fact Disclosure, 46 FLA. L. REV. 105 (1994) (explaining the new disclosure
rules); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The What and Why of the New Discovery Rules, 46
FLA. L. REV. 9 (1994).
But see supra notes 207-208, 233 and accompanying text.
'2 Notice of Motion for Plaintiff and accompanying Declaration of H. Pitman,
Sept. 27, 1991. The declaration stated that after three weeks had passed from the
August 30, 1991 order, a letter was sent to defendants demanding production of
documents. It also stated that defendants failed to respond to the letter, thus,
they failed to comply with the August 30, 1991 order. Curiously, this letter is not
included in the docket sheets or record.
' Dunne Affidavit, Nov. 5, 1991.
' Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, Bambu Sales, Inc. v. Ozak
Trading, Inc., No. 89 Civ. 1426 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 1992).
"5 Id. at 1-7.
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obtain compliance with the particular order issued; and (3) to
serve as a general deterrent, provided that the party against
whom sanctions are imposed was, in some sense, at faultY6
The magistrate judge stated that the greater the fault, the
greater the severity of the sanction.' She further explained
that due process comes into play, inter alia, to provide the
party against whom sanctions are being contemplated with a
"fair chance to be heard." 8 In addition, the magistrate judge
noted that gross negligence, not simple negligence or mere
oversight of counsel, constitutes fault in the Second Cir-
cuitY
9
The part of the recommendation that actually addressed
the default sanction and the reason for its appropriateness in
the case was relatively short.' In this portion of the recom-
mendation, the magistrate judge acknowledged that a default
judgment should be imposed only when no lesser sanction
would be "efficacious.""1 However, the magistrate judge also
pointed out that the Second Circuit had repeatedly emphasized
that the "strong medicine" of default judgment must be admin-
istered in "appropriate cases" to prevent Rule 37 from becom-
ing a "paper tiger."' Citing National Hockey,' the magis-
trate judge noted that selecting an appropriate sanction re-
quired consideration of the entire record in the case.' After
2" Id. at 8 (citing Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publishing, Ltd., 843 F.2d 67, 71
(2d Cir. 1988)).
21 I& at 9.
1T Id. (citing Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 US. 197, 209 (1958); Alvarez
v. Simmons Mlkt. Research Bureau, Inc., 839 F.2d 930, 932 (2d Cir. 1988)).
'7' Report and Recommendation, (citing Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v.
Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 602 F.2d 1062, 1067 (2d Cir. 1979)); sce supra note
184 and accompanying text
I Report and Recommendation at 9-15.
281 Id. at 9 (citation omitted).
Id. (citations omitted).
427 U.S. 639, 641-43, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 874 (1976).
21 Report and Recommendation at 10, Bambu (No. 89-1426). According to the
magistrate judge's report and recommendation, as late as February 20, 1991, both
parties in this litigation had advised the district judge that further discovery was
needed. Id. at 3 n.2. Furthermore, the magistrate judge noted that when defen-
dants requested an extension in March of 1991, followed by a letter from plaintiff
noting outstanding discovery requests, "In]either letter explained why these dis-
putes had not been submitted, or discovery completed, prior to the previous dead-
line. . . ." Id. at 3 n.3. It seems disingenuous to claim that an exploration of the
entire record in this case would lead one to conclude that defendants willfully
violated discovery for the time frame stated in the report and recommendation. It
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considering the entire record, the magistrate judge concluded
that: (1) defendants and their attorney acted with the requisite
degree of fault necessary to justify entry of default judgment;
(2) defendants and their attorney had adequate notice2" that
persistence in their "obstructive course of conduct" could result
in a loss of opportunity to defend on the merits; and (3) no
lesser sanctions would be efficacious in bringing about compli-
ance or deterring similar conduct in the future.286 A brief
summary of the magistrate judge's conclusions follows.
1. Fault Is Found
The magistrate judge acknowledged that the culpable
conduct in this case was, "on the face of it, that of defendant [ I
[Gratch's] attorney." 7 However, she correctly identified the
Second Circuit's position that attorney misconduct is no basis
for relieving a client of consequences associated with such
nisconduct.m The magistrate judge found that defense
counsel's actions were not mere oversight or simple negligence.
Rather, she characterized the conduct as a pattern of tactical
obstruction that proved that the defendants' claims lacked
merit." 9 But the magistrate judge never addressed the fact
that defendants had complained of tactical obstruction by the
plaintiff for its failure to produce a Bambu officer for deposi-
tion.' In addition, it appears that she ignored the fact that
both parties were at fault for failing to comply with discovery
is unclear from the record what was going on during this time frame. Some docu-
ments were produced and others apparently were not. Gratch attended his deposi-
tions, although he was improperly instructed not to respond to questions based on
relevance. The only bona fide, identifiable "abuses" were counsel's failure to appear
for the settlement conference in April of 1991 and the failure to comply with the
August 30, 1991 discovery order. Id. at 4-5.
' As used by the magistrate judge, "notice" is to be distinguished from "warn"
or "warning." Report and Recommendation at 13-14, Bambu (No. 89-1426).
216 Id. at 10.
28'Id. at 11.
I Id. at 12 (citing, inter alia, Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34
(1962); Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 602
F.2d 1062, 1068 (2d Cir. 1979)).
21 Id. at 13 (citations omitted).
"" See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
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deadlines and for failing to notify her of difficulty in complet-
ing discovery within the originally prescribed deadlines.3
2. Proper Notice Received
Citing Thomas E. Hoar, Inc. v. Sara Lee Corp.,p the
magistrate judge tersely concluded that defendants' due pro-
cess rights had been satisfied. 3 Not only did the defendants
take full advantage of their opportunity to be heard by oppos-
ing the motion to dismiss, but they also would have another
opportunity to be heard by filing an objection to the recommen-
dation.' The fact that the defendants were not warned by
the court that default judgment might result for failure to
comply with the August 30, 1991 order was not addressed.
3. Inefficacy of Lesser Sanctions
The magistrate judge decided that no lesser sanction was
adequate to address the seriousness of the violation in this
case. She determined that any sanction short of default would
permit the recalcitrant parties to benefit from their miscon-
duct, which could not be tolerated.' The magistrate judge
" See supra notes 252, 264 and accompanying text.
2 882 F.2d 682, 688 (2d Cir. 1989).
1 Report and Recommendation at 13, Bambu (No. 89-1426). The due process
issue raised by the plaintiff in Thomas Hoar was the fact that the district court
did not hold a hearing to determine fault and allocate sanctions between client
and counsel. Thomas Hoar, Inc. v. Sara Lee Corp., 900 F.2d 522, 526 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 846 (1990). The Second Circuit rejected this due process
argument because the record revealed that plaintiff had been afforded the opportu-
nity to submit oppositions to every motion to compel and objections to every order
imposed by the court. Id. at 527. Thus, plaintiff could not validly be heard to
complain that it did not have notice of, or the opportunity to be heard about, the
sanction. Id. The argument raised in the Bambu case is not comparable because
the notice complained of by defendants' counsel concerns a warning by the court
as opposed to notice and opportunity to be heard. Despite the fact that such a
requirement is paternalistic-Rule 37 ought to be warning enough-the fact is that
usually courts warn parties prior to imposing severe sanctions. The Second Circuit
is no stranger to this practice. See supra notes 207-208, 233.
1 Report and Recommendation at 14, Bambu (No. 89-1426).
2 The issue was not addressed by the magistrate judge, district judge or Sec-
ond Circuit in its opinion. In its Second Circuit brief, the defendants specifically
argue that there was no notice of the "imminence or posibility of... default
given by the magistrate judge. Brief for Defendants at 18, 20.
1 Report and Recommendation at 14, Bambu (No. 89-1426).
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also concluded that no useful purpose would be served by an-
other order directing discovery.297 She noted that the case
should have been ready for trial on December 28, 1990.298
Rather than issue another order, she decided it was time to
put an end to what she deemed was procrastination.2 9
The defendants objected to the magistrate judge's report
and recommendation largely because Doron Gratch had been
too ill to appear for a third deposition and because defendants
did not deliberately or willfully delay the proceedings in this
matter.0 0  Affirmations by both defendants' counsel and
Doron Gratch accompanied the objection. In addition, a num-
ber of Gratch's medical bills and insurance statements were
submitted to substantiate the claim that he was too ill to be
deposed.30 '
The district judge accepted the magistrate's report and rec-
ommendation and entered default judgment against the defen-
dants.0 2 The district judge indicated that she had reviewed
2 Id. at 14.
" Id. But see supra Part IVA indicating that the record does not demonstrate
that the initial delay concerning discovery in the case can be attributed solely to
.obstructionist tactics" by the defendants. The order of August 30, 1991 is the only
order that the defendants failed to comply with save for counsel not appearing at
the April 1991 settlement conference.
i' Report and Recommendation at 14-15, Bambu (No. 89-1426). One cannot
help but wonder if procrastination can truly be characterized as contumacious,
justifying the striking of a defense on the merits.
" Objections by Defendants to Report and Recommendation at 1-5, Bambu
Sales, Inc. v. Ozak Trading, Inc., No. 90 Civ. 1426 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1992). Unfor-
tunately, deliberate and willful failure is not the standard in the Second Circuit.
As discussed supra note 184 and accompanying text, gross negligence constitutes
fault in the Second Circuit. Thus, deliberate or willful failure is not a necessary
precursor to the imposition of a litigation-ending sanction.
301 One bill seemed to demonstrate that Gratch received emergency hospital
consultation from Dr. Renald E. Strobal on August 26, 1991, and was not dis-
charged until August 27, 1991. Statement of Renald E. Strobel, M.D. Another bill
for $1500 showed that heart treatment of some sort was received by Gratch on
August 29, 1991. Cardiovascular Authorization Billing Service for Service Received,
August 29, 1991. Numerous other bills seem to demonstrate that Grateh was also
in the hospital from August 28 through August 30, 1991, and visited his doctor on
several occasions in September as well as October 1991. See Appendix to Defen-
dants' Appeal to the Second Circuit at 256-282a, Bambu (No. 93-7913).
"0 Order Accepting Magistrate Judge's Report & Recommendation, No. 93 Civ.
7913 (S.D.N.Y. May 15, 1992) [hereinafter Default Order]. Just prior to the district
judge's decision on the Rule 37 motion from September 27, 1991, the plaintiff
again moved to certify defendants' continuing failure to comply with the August
30, 1991 order. Notice of Motion for Plaintiff, Mar. 20, 1992. Defendants objected
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de novo the portions of the report and recommendation con-
cerning Doron Gratch's alleged illness during September and
October 1991. Despite evidence of the medical bills and other
statements, the district judge held that Gratch's illness was
not established by defendants' submissions." The district
judge agreed with the report's recommendation to grant
plaintiffs motion for default judgment "on the grounds that
defendants had failed to comply with a discovery order entered
on August 30, 1991.""' Apparently, the district judge did not
recommend default judgment on the grounds that defendants
had deliberately and willfully failed to comply with discovery
throughout the course of the litigation. Rather, she affi ed
the default strictly on the ground that defendants had failed to
comply with the August 30, 1991 order."'
D. Bambu on Appeal-Second Circuit Affirms
On June 26, 1995, the Second Circuit affirmed the default
judgment entered against the defendants in Bambu.' It
characterized the discovery proceedings in the case as a "Sta-
lingrad battle,""0 ' and noted that "[a]ifter defendants violated
a discovery order, and in light of other acts of delay and ob-
struction spanning more than one year, the magistrate judge
recommended entry of a default judgment pursuant to [Rule]
37."308 The court reiterated the findings in the magistrate
judge report and recommendation and then held that the
defendants' arguments with respect to abuse of discretion were
"meritless."0 9 The court rejected what it characterized as all
three of defendants' claims regarding the impropriety of the
to this motion by letter dated April 2, 1992. The magistrate judge denied the
motion without prejudice on April 10, 1992. See Appendix to Defendants! Appeal to
the Second Circuit at 285a-321a, Bambu (No. 93-7913).
11 Default Order at 1 n.1.
31Id at 1.
' Of course it might be that the failure to comply was deemed gros negli-
gence and that such conduct warrants severe sanctions in the Second Circuit.
However, this issue was not addressed in this case.
" Bambu Sales, Inc. v. Ozak Trading Inc., 58 F.3d 849 (2d Cir. 1995).
3 Id. at 851.
3 Id. at 850 (emphasis added).
Id. at 851-53.
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default judgment order.10 First, the defendants argued that
they had complied with the discovery order." Second, they
maintained that the order was inadequate because it failed to
specify a deadline for compliance." Lastly, they claimed that
they had produced the documents called for by the August 30,
1991 order. 13 Numerous other arguments put forward by de-
fendants in their moving brief, however, were not mentioned.
For instance, defendants repeatedly argued that default was
not appropriate because the magistrate judge failed to warn
them of its likelihood or even possibility.314 Defendants also
correctly pointed out that the magistrate judge based her con-
clusion regarding their recalcitrance on the fact that there
were numerous postponements of discovery deadlines in the
case,31 but both parties shared the blame for these
delays.3
16
Acknowledging the extremity of a measure such as the
entry of default judgment, the court explained its policy that
discovery orders are meant to be followed and that one who
flouts such orders does so at his or her own peril.1 7 As noted
previously,38 the court explained the result in the Bambu
case by likening it to a game of mere chance: "Defendants
rolled the dice on the district court's tolerance for deliberate
obstruction, and they lost. We have no intention of letting
them return to the table."1 '
310 Id.
"1 See Brief for Defendants at 6-7, 10, 15, 19, 20-25.
312 Id. at 8, 17, 20, 25.
3" Id. at 6-7, 10, 15, 19, 20-25.
314 Id. at 17, 18, 20. However paternalistic, there is a great deal of case prece-
dent in the Second Circuit that intimates warnings ought to be given prior to
imposing litigation-ending sanctions. See supra notes 207-208, 233 and accompany-
ing text.
3' Brief for Defendants at 18.
316 Id.
317 Bambu, 58 F.3d at 849, 853 (citing Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publishing,
Ltd., 843 F.2d 67, 73 (2d Cir. 1988)).
318 See supra notes 101, 158.
319 Bambu, 58 F.3d at 853.
[Vol. 62: 585
1996] LITIGATION-ENDING SANCTIONS FOR DISCOVERYABUSE 643
V. ANALYSIS OF SECOND CIRCUIT APPROACH IN LIGHT OF
BAMBU
The entry of default judgment in the Bambu case seems
wrong even though the defendants clearly failed to comply
with the August 30, 1991 discovery order. For one thing, the
Bambu result is extreme in comparison with other Second
Circuit cases. Unlike several other cases in the Second Circuit,
Bambu involved a failure to comply with only one court or-
der,32 and there was no indication that failure to comply
would lead to a default judgment remedy."'
Although Rule 37 provides for such sanctions, and the
Second Circuit has affirmed such sanctions in other cases, the
facts in Bambu do not appear to fit comfortably within the
facts of other Second Circuit cases affirming litigation-ending
sanctions." Even though the court did not accept the prof-
fered documents as a valid excuse for noncompliance, there
was some proof that defendant Gratch was ill shortly after the
entry of the order."r In addition, prior to the motion to corn-
See supra notes 202, 205.
See supra notes 207-208, 233.
' See, e.g., Valentine v. Museum of Modern Art, 29 F.3d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 1994)
(dismissing action against plaintiff after repeated and explicit warnings affirmed);
Minotti v. Lensink, 895 F.2d 100, 103 (2d Cir. 1990) (affirming dismissal against
plaintiff for failing to comply with at least four discovery orders); Sieck v. Russo,
869 F.2d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 1989) (upholding million dollar default judgments
against defendants for repeated refusal to attend depositions and after milder
monetary sanctions already imposed); McDonald v. Head Criminal Court Supervi-
sor Officer, 850 F.2d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 1988) (dismissing pro se plaintiffs claim for
failure to comply with court orders and responding to request to comply with
statement that "the Judge can go to hell"); John B. Hull, Inc. v. Waterbury Petro-
leum Prods., Inc., 845 F.2d 1172, 1177 (2d Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal against
plaintiff after failure to comply with three orders and several warnings that non-
compliance would result in dismissal); Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publishing, Ltd.,
843 F.2d 67, 72 (2d Cir. 1988) (affirming imposition of preclusive sanctions tanta-
mount to dismissal against defendant after numerous failures to comply with dis-
covery orders); Jones v. Niagara Frontier Transp. Auth., 836 F.2d 731, 735 (2d
Cir. 1987) (dismissing plaintiffs case for repeated refusal, in the face of several
orders, to appear for and answer questions in a deposition despite advice from
counsel); Independent Investor Protective League v. Touche Ross & Co., 607 F.2d
530, 533-34 (2d Cir.) (affirming dismissal against plaintiffs because answers to
interrogatories were not filed in accordance with court order and plaintiffs made
false statements and gave false testimony regarding timeliness of Eervice of an-
swers), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 895 (1978).
See supra notes 273, 301 and accompanying text.
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pel, it appeared that both parties frustrated the discovery
process by refusing to produce information3" and delaying
the completion of discovery by the district court's initial dead-
lines.325 The record makes it appear as if these facts were
brushed aside by the magistrate judge, the district judge and
the Second Circuit.
Furthermore, this is not a case where the party against
whom the order was entered refused to comply outright."6
The Bambu defendants did not sit idly by ignoring interrogato-
ries or other discovery requests. In fact, a great deal of discov-
ery had already been conducted smoothly between the parties,
another fact neither mentioned nor considered by the courts.
Thus, unlike other cases where the Second Circuit deemed a
litigation-ending sanction appropriate, this is not a case where
the party against whom the order was entered refused to com-
324 The plaintiff complained that its interrogatories were not being answered
fully and that Doron Gratch had not been properly deposed. The defendants re-
peatedly tried to depose an officer of plaintiffs company who the plaintiff did not
produce. Although not substantiated by the judge, it also appears in the record
that the defendants complained that plaintiff had told defendants' customers that
it was engaged in illegal activity. The magistrate judge in her report and recom-
mendation expressly noted that the parties were not complying with her order to
try and achieve settlement. See supra notes 263-273 and accompanying text.
' The parties jointly applied to move discovery deadline from June 1990 to
December 1990. When the deadline passed, neither party requested another dead-
line or sought judicial resolution of discovery disputes. It was only in March of
1991 that "problems" surfaced and only because defendant took an affirmative stop
to extend the deadline to complete discovery. Defendant's attorney sought a 30-day
extension so that he could depose an officer of the plaintiff, who apparently had
not been made available to defendants. Plaintiffs attorney responded the next day,
citing various outstanding discovery requests, which ultimately led to a motion to
compel in August of 1991. Certainly, the record indicates that defendants did not
comply with this order. However, it is equally valid to state the plaintiff did not
comply with the court's initial orders regarding the discovery deadline. It was his
duty to inform the court in December of 1990 that discovery was not complete and
why. One wonders what would have happened had defendant not moved to extend
the deadline again in March of 1991. See supra notes 263-273 and accompanying
text.
32 See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Noble Metals Intl, 67 F.3d
766, 775-99 (9th Cir. 1995) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (The dissenting judge argued
that ordering plaintiffs complaint to be taken as established as a Rule 37(b)(2)
sanction for discovery failure was an abuse of discretion: The district court failed
to adequately warn parties of extreme measure, did not consider less harsh sanc-
tions, and default judgment is reserved for defendants who make any type of
discovery virtually impossible. The disobedient party here failed to appear at depo-
sitions but had not failed to produce documents as well.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
64 (1996).
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ply without a legitimate reason. As previously mentioned, it
was the defendants' request to extend the discovery deadline a
second time, in order to depose plaintiffs officer, that prompted
the plaintiff to complain about discovery problems.' The fact
that the plaintiff never produced this officer was not addressed
by the magistrate judge, district judge or the Second Cir-
cuit.32
The magistrate judge concluded that the information
sought by the plaintiff in the Bambu case was crucial to the
plaintiffs case. This conclusion partly justified her determina-
tion that any lesser sanction against the defendants would be
inefficacious.3" However, the Bambu plaintiff never indicated
to the court that the information sought was crucial to its case.
Indeed, as already noted above, the facts regarding extending
the discovery deadline proved to the contrary. Based on these
facts and Second Circuit precedent, it seems that the entry of
default judgment for failure to comply with the magistrate
judge's order was simply too harsh.' 0 In addition, although
not in accordance with Second Circuit case law, it also seems
unfair that defendant Gratch lost his chance to defend the case
on its merits because of his counsel's conduct.3'
Yet, it is reasonable, on the other hand, to agree with the
court that some other sanction was appropriate for the non-
comliliance by the defendants. The defendants failed to take
any steps to comply with the August 30, 1991 discovery order.
Even though discovery problems in the case are partially at-
tributable to the plaintiff, it is clear that the defendants partic-
ipated in delaying the case well beyond the time the court
determined necessary to complete discovery. One need only
See supra notes 257-258 and accompanying text.
'.' Cf Amernational Indus. v. Action-Tungsram, Inc., 925 F.2d 970, 978 (6th
Cir.) (reversing default judgment and noting that both sides were not model liti-
gants), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1233 (1991).
' Report and Recommendation at 14-15, Bambu (No. 89-1426).
' See supra Parts H1.C, III.D for a discussion on Second Circuit precedent
regarding the imposition of litigation-ending sanctions.
" Although no recommendation or opinion in the Bambu case so suggests, it
seems likely that the history of abuse which prompted the magistrate judge to
impose, and Circuit to afirm, default was largely influenced by defense counsel's
conduct regarding depositions, failing to appear for a settlement conference, and
failing to notify the court that Gratch was ill just subsequent to the April 1991
discovery order.
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
examine several of defendants' arguments in their brief to see
that failure to comply, or even gross negligence with respect to
compliance, with the discovery order is the only way to catego-
rize their conduct. 32 Defense counsel's conduct during deposi-
tions and his failure to appear for a settlement conference are
just two telling examples of inappropriate behavior warranting
a remedial measure.333 Moreover, defendants' counsel offered
no viable explanation or excuse for his failure to contact the
judge during the period when Doron Gratch was purportedly
ill.3" The majority of arguments raised by defendants in
their brief before the Second Circuit was premised on the claim
that they had complied with the order by the time the magis-
trate judge issued her report and recommendation. 35 Defen-
dants failed to acknowledge, therefore, what National Hockey
and its Second Circuit progeny made clear: Flouting discovery
orders is not permissible despite tardy compliance.
How can these simultaneous notions-that the sanction
appears too harsh and, yet, that perhaps it or some other
harsh sanction may have been appropriate nonetheless-be
reconciled? What can be said or done with respect to litigation-
ending sanctions in the Second Circuit that would alleviate
dissatisfaction with the result in these types of cases? Ironical-
ly, in order to preserve the circuit's strong policy disfavoring
discovery abuse, a less discretionary rule is necessary to pro-
vide some consistency to this area of discovery law. The magis-
trate judge and district judge in Bambu acted within their
discretion in making the tough determination to enter default
judgment. But the message the case sends to other litigants
' For example, defendants attempted to obfuscate their own wrongdoing by
arguing that plaintiff provided no explanation for the need to review certain re-
cords and documents. Brief for Defendants at 8.
See supra notes 246-247, 261 and accompanying text discussing defense
counsel's improper actions in the Bambu case.
" In an affirmation in opposition to plaintiffs motion for default judgment, Mr.
Gerard Dunne explains that he tried to reach his client numerous times after the
August 30, 1991 discovery order was issued but was unable to do so because of
Gratch's illness. Affirmation of Gerard Dunne, Nov. 5, 1991. Mr. Dunne offers no
explanation for his failure to notify the court about this situation, and his claim
that he kept plaintiffs counsel apprised of the situation is not supported by any
document or evidence in the record. See Brief for Defendants at 9-10.
' Brief for Defendants at 6-9, 19, 20-25.
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and judges is that sanction imposition may be a game of
chance or a roll of the dice.s
The Second Circuit, beyond the Societe Internationale
requirements,"7 has no set policy or approach for its district
courts when assessing the propriety of imposing a litigation-
ending sanction for failure to comply with a discovery order
pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2).1 As a result, the outcomes in cas-
es involving litigation-ending sanctions are inconsistent, and
the message intended for litigants regarding discovery abuse is
far from clear. Considering the limited standard of review,
Bambu Sales, Inc. v. Ozak Trading, Inc., 58 F.3d 849, 853 (2d Cir. 1995).
See supra notes 36-45 and accompanying text discussing the holding in
Societe Internationale. However, with respect to the client's misconduct, it seems
clear that the failure to comply was not necessarily due to any willfulness or bad
faith. Right or wrong, Mr. Gratch was not available shortly after the order was
entered due to illness. His counsel did nothing to remedy the situation. At the
least, defense counsel's inaction during this critical time frame can be character-
ized as inexcusable neglect which, under Cine, would justify the imposition of a
harsh sanction against both counsel and client. But sce Cine Forty-Second St.
Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 602 F.2d 1062, 1069 (2d Cir. 1979)
(Oakes, J., concurring) ("It would be with the greatest reluctance, however, that I
would visit upon the client the sins of counsel, absent client's knowledge, condona-
tion, compliance, or causation.").
Ironically, the Second Circuit has delineated five factors that are pertinent for
its courts to consider prior to a Rule 41(b) dismissal, which is an involuntary
dismissal for failure of "plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any
order of the court": (1) the duration of plaintiffs failures; (2) whether plaintiff has
received notice that further delays would result in dismissal; (3) whether defen-
dant is likely to be prejudiced by further delay; (4) the balance between alleviating
court calendar congestion and protecting a party's right to due process and a fair
chance to be heard; and (5) the efficacy of lesser sanctions. See, eg., Martin v.
Metropolitan Museum of Art, 158 F.R.D. 289, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (citing Alvarez
v. Simmons Mkt. Research, 839 F.2d 930, 932 (2d Cir. 1988)); see also Jackson v.
City of New York, 22 F.3d 71, 74-96 (2d Cir. 1994) (applying five factors as guide-
lines and determining that district court incorrectly dismissed complaint--a harsh
remedy to be utilized only in extreme situations) (citing Harding v. Federal Re-
serve Bank of New York, 707 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1972) (quoting Theilmann v.
Rutland Hosp., Inc., 455 F.2d 853, 855 (2d Cir. 1972) (per curiam))); FED. R. CIw.
P. 41(b). Why the Second Circuit has not implemented a similar set of factors to
be considered in the Rule 37(b)(2) context is not clear.
"Indeed, the sources of judges' sanctioning power are diverse, and the stan-
dards invoked have not always been either clear or consistently applied Oliveri v.
Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1271 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987).
It is rare for circuit courts to find that district courts abuse their discretion.
"[Dlistrict judges have broad discretion in imposing sanctions. Corporation of
Lloyd's v. Lloyd's U.S., 831 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1987). 'The concept of discretion
implies that a decision is lawful at any point within the outer limits of the range
of choices appropriate to the issue at hand ... ." Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City
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district court discretion is simply too broad. Some type of stan-
dard approach is needed in the Second Circuit to guide both
lower court judges and litigants.
A case as simple as Bambu presents a perfect example of
the Second Circuit's shortcomings in this area, particularly
with respect to deterrence.34 The defendants in the Bambu
case can hardly be said to have been deterred from further
discovery abuse by the decision. In fact, their arguments before
the Second Circuit indicate a blatant disregard of this goal. 1
For other litigants, this case, like most of the others in the
circuit, seems to represent not that litigation-ending sanctions
will be imposed against a party failing to comply with an or-
der, but rather that litigation-ending sanctions may be im-
posed. 2
A more systematic approach to imposing litigation-ending
sanctions under Rule 37 is desirable. With a more methodical
approach courts can come closer to generally deterring discov-
ery abuse. If parties believe that sanction imposition is a mat-
ter of chance, the potential for deterrence is undermined. 3
of New York, 821 F.2d 121, 123 (2d Cir.) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
918 (1987).
" The Bambu decision is short and straightforward. The discussion with re-
spect to entering default -judgment for failure to comply with a discovery order
covers, at most, two and one half pages of double-spaced text.
341 The brief submitted by defendants demonstrates their belief that compliance,
regardless of its timeliness, obviates the propriety of sanction imposition. Last
minute compliance does not serve the deterrent purpose of sanction imposition.
See, e.g., William Wayne Kilgarlin & Don Jackson, Sanctions for Discovery Abuse
under New Rule 215, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 767, 772 (1984) (citing Cine as support
for this proposition).
34 In this respect, it would seem that Rule 37 sanctions mirror Rule 11 sanc-
tions. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c) ("If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to
respond, the court determines that [there has been a violation], the court may,
subject to the conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the
attorneys, law firms, or parties that . . . are responsible for the violation.") (em-
phasis added). However, unlike Rule 37, Rule 11 does not contemplate, discuss or
even authorize the severe sanction of dismissal or default. See FED. R. Civ. P.
11(c)(2) (discussing the nature and limitations of sanctions in terms of monetary
sanctions only). Comparing Rule 11 and Rule 37 may be appropriate for some
purposes. But clearly the application of Rule 11 is not particularly useful with re-
spect to analyzing the propriety of litigation-ending sanctions. Less certainty and
greater flexibility is acceptable in the Rule 11 context precisely because it does not
contemplate the use of harsh or severe sanctions like dismissal and default.
" In a compelling article proposing to enforce strict deadlines and make sanc-
tion imposition mandatory in certain situations as a way to decrease what the
author perceives as serious discovery abuse problems, it is noted that "lawyers
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While fear of the unknown might deter some litigants, it is
more probable that if there is no consistency in application, de-
terrence cannot be achieved. This is particularly undesirable
when dealing with litigation-ending sanctions, " where criti-
cal policies like judicial efficiency" and the avoidance of
abuse of process are at odds with other policies that favor
hearing a case on its merits. A truly careful balancing of com-
peting interests must occur, lest other equally compelling poli-
cies inherent in the Federal Rules will be hampered."6
behave badly when they think their clients stand to gain from abusive behavior
and when courts tacitly allow it." Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Discouery Abuse Revisited:
Some Specific Proposals to Amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 26 U.S.F.
L. REV. 189, 193 (1992). By admitting that sanction imposition merely depends
upon the patience of the judge, the message sent to litigators seems to be some
form of tacit approval of discovery delay-provided that the litigant is lucky
enough to have a judge who allows it. Mr. Dudley states that one of the major
impediments to eliminating discovery abuse is the "collectively hostile attitude of
judges to discovery disputes." Id. at 211 (citation omitted).
'" See Estate of Spear v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Serv., 41 F.3d 103,
110 (3d Cir. 1994) (discussing the distinction between sanctions that end a case
and those that make a party's ability to prevail more difficult).
34 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are to be 'construed and administered
to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." FED. R.
CIV. P. 1.
" It seems as if courts that were once perhaps too hesitant to impose sanc-
tions might be too quick to do so now. As alluded to supra note 1 and accompany-
ing text, there is a great push to contain what is perceived as rampant discovery
abuse. See Craig Enoch, Incivility in the Legal System? Maybe It's the Rules, 47
SMU L. REV. 199, 222 (1994) (MConcerns regarding manipulative litigation prac-
tices (especially discovery abuses) spawned the amendment and increased use of
Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the 1970's."); Carl Tobias, Com-
mon Sense and Other Legal Reforms, 48 VAND. L. REV. 699, 703 (1995) (noting
that in mid-1970's concerns about abuse of civil litigation process came to the fore
and courts were urged to sanction attorneys and parties who engaged in abuse of
the process). The goal is laudable, but competing policies must not be overlooked.
Litigation-ending sanctions are meant to be a last, not a first, resort. They should
be utilized only when necessary, and the policies disfavoring their imposition
should not be forgotten or buried in the zeal to keep trial calendars tidy. "[Any
time a trial court contemplates disposal of a lawsuit on procedural grounds rather
than on the merits it must exercise caution." Kilgarlin & Jackon, supra note 341,
at 802 (discussing extreme sanctions under Texas rules of civil procedure). The
Third Circuit discussed this issue at length in a case where it upheld a dismissal
for discovery abuse:
We recognize that recent literature exhorting the district judge to move
litigation expeditiously by taking firm control and the 1983 amendments
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with their numerous references to
sanctions may have contributed to premature dismissals or defaults. Al-
though sanctions are a necessary part of any court system, we are con-
cerned that the recent preoccupation with sanctions and the use of dis-
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For all these reasons, the policies that are important to
the Second Circuit can better be preserved if a consistent ap-
proach is followed when imposing severe sanctions. The Second
Circuit would, therefore, benefit from adopting a test similar to
the ones used by the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth and
Tenth Circuits. The Second Circuit could fashion its test to
embody its policies concerning compliance and, at the same
time, require district courts to specifically consider various
factors prior to imposing litigation-ending sanctions. Finding
fault, as prescribed by Societe Internationale, is simply not
enough. What follows is a proposal for a Second Circuit test to
be applied whenever determining the propriety of a litigation-
ending sanction.
VI. PROPOSAL
A. Preface
Discovery abuse cannot and should not be tolerated. The
Supreme Court made this clear in 1976 when it specifically
endorsed the imposition of litigation-ending sanctions as a
response to noncompliance with discovery orders by stating
that "the most severe in the spectrum of sanctions provided by
statute or rule must be available to the district court ....
Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also acknowl-
edges that discovery abuse should not be tolerated by provid-
ing judges with a mechanism to sanction parties who fail to
meet their discovery obligations.
Courts undeniably have authority under Rule 37(b)(2) to
dismiss a disobedient party's action or render a default judg-
ment against it for failure to comply with a discovery order.
This authority has been exercised by courts in every circuit.
What is bothersome is not that a court has the power to im-
missal as a necessary "weapon" in the trial court's "arsenal" may be
contributing to or effecting an atmosphere in which the meritorious
claims or defenses of innocent parties are no longer the central issue. It
does not further the goal of a court system, that of delivering evenhand-
ed justice to litigants ....
Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863, 867 (3d Cir. 1984).
" National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639,
643 (1976) (per curiam).
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pose a litigation-ending sanction, or even that many courts
exercise that power. They should. Perhaps, as many critics
suggest, they should do so more often."5 But depriving a liti-
gant of any chance to try a case on its merits is a serious mat-
ter. Regardless of the circumstances and however deserving or
necessary, the imposition of such a drastic measure must com-
port with basic notions of fairness and justice. Moreover, if
such sanctions are to have any deterrent effect, they must be
imposed more consistently.
.The Second Circuit, among others, allows district courts to
determine on a case-by-case basis what to consider in making
the determination of whether discovery misconduct warrants
default or dismissal. Other circuits have well-settled factors
that its district courts are required to consider when imposing
litigation-ending sanctions. The danger inherent in the Second
Circuit's current approach is that the decision to impose the
harshest sanctions, as demonstrated by the Bambu case, may
simply be a matter of chance. District court judges are neither
required to take certain matters into consideration, nor are
they given any guidance with respect to what should be consid-
ered prior to imposing a litigation-ending sanction.
Clearly articulating factors a court must consider will
resolve some of the ambiguity that exists between the Second
Circuit's position that orders are meant to be followed, and the
actual and inconsistent manner in which litigation-ending
sanction cases are decided. Even though requiring district
courts to weigh fixed standards will not guarantee absolute
uniformity in result, at least there will be uniformity in ap-
proach. This uniformity will ensure some consistency and si-
multaneously preserve judicial discretion. The tools with which
to fashion a Second Circuit test can be found in the Third,
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits' approaches.'
Simply copying one circuit, however, is not desirable because
no circuit's test adequately addresses all of the important fac-
tors that need to be considered. In addition, some courts
m~ See, eg., Meade W. Mitchell, Comment. Discouery Abuse and a Proposed Re-
form: Mandatory Disclosure, 62 IlSS. L.. 743, 748 (1993) (VSurveys of attorneys
and judges demonstrate the severity of discovery problems in modern litigation
S.. ra).
w.' See supra notes 103-108.
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consider factors that, arguably, are not necessary nor critical to
making a decision regarding the imposition of litigation-ending
sanctions.35
Prior to imposing a litigation-ending sanction, the Second
Circuit should require.5 its district courts to consider and
specifically articulate findings35 2 with respect to the following
four factors: (1) whether the disobedient party acted willfully
or was at fault; (2) the history of abuse on both sides, including
the efficacy of lesser sanctions; (3) whether the sanction is nec-
essary for general deterrence; and (4) the client's awareness of
or involvement in the abuse. The district court should not be
required to assign a fixed amount of weight to any single fac-
tor. Imposing such a requirement would unnecessarily restrict
discretion. Furthermore, each factor need not be present in or-
der for a district court to impose a litigation-ending sanction.
This, too, would encroach excessively upon the district court's
" For instance, a specific warning requirement is not necessary. See infra
discussion at Part VI.B.2 regarding the first factor of the proposed test for the
Second Circuit. In addition, requiring a court to consider the amount of prejudice
to the opposing party, while important, is not critical. See infra Part VI.B.3 dis.
cussing the general deterrence factor in the proposed Second Circuit test.
351 It is interesting to note that some circuits say district courts "should" consid-
er certain factors and other circuits say that district courts "must" consider certain
factors. See, e.g., Beil v. Lakewood Eng'g and Mfg. Co., 15 F.3d 546, 552 (6th Cir.
1994) (NT]his court has announced several factors that it should consider when
deciding whether the district court abused its discretion by imposing sanctions.")
(emphasis added); Ehrenhaus v. Reynolds, 965 F.2d 916, 921 (10th Cir. 1992)
("Before choosing dismissal as a just sanction, a court should ordinarily consider a
number of factors .... These factors do not constitute a rigid test; rather they
represent criteria for the district court to consider ... [and t]he court should
ordinarily evaluate these factors on the record."). But see FDIC v. Conner, 20 F.3d
1376, 1380 (5th Cir. 1994) ("[W]e have articulated several factors that must be
present before a district court may dismiss a case as a sanction for violating a
discovery order.") (emphasis added); Henry v. Gill Indus., 983 F.2d 943, 948 (9th
Cir. 1993) ("Because the sanction of dismissal is such a harsh penalty, the district
court must weigh five factors before imposing dismissal . . . .") (emphasis added)
(citing Porter v. Martinez, 941 F.2d 732, 733 (9th Cir. 1991)); Wanderer v.
Johnston, 910 F.2d 652, 656 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that a district court need not
make explicit findings regarding each factor, but if it does not then the appellate
court must review the record independently); Mutual Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Richards & Assocs., 872 F.2d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 1989) ("[C]ompeting interests require
the application of a four-part test . . . .") (emphasis added). Ideally, the consider-
ation of certain factors should be mandatory. However, saying a court should do
something as opposed to saying it must seems to preserve judicial discretion.
352 This is also required by Rule 11: "When imposing sanctions, the court shall
describe the conduct determined to constitute a violation of this rule and explain
the basis for the sanction imposed." FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(3).
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discretion. What is important is that the various factors be
carefully and consistently considered. To ensure this, district
court judges ought to be required to articulate how each factor
was considered and why a particular result was reached. Not
only is it desirable to have a fixed set of standards, but it is
'also desirable for each factor to be as unambiguous as possible.
District courts would, therefore, benefit from guidance regard-
ing what constitutes adequate consideration of any given fac-
tor.
B. The Proposed Factors for the Second Circuit
1. Willfulness or Fault
The Supreme Court requires willfulness or fault to be
present before a litigation-ending sanction can justly be im-
posed on a disobedient party.' Interestingly, only the Sec-
ond Circuit has held that gross negligence meets the willful-
ness or fault requirement.' The difference between simple
negligence and gross negligence is a matter of degree that
defies precise description or definition. Because of this, requir-
ing only gross negligence, as opposed to deliberate, intentional
or wanton conduct, seems extreme. Nonetheless, gross negli-
gence should continue to suffice to prove willfulness or fault for
a number of reasons.
First, gross negligence as the standard for willfulness
coheres with the Second Circuit's policy regarding intolerance
for discovery failures. Furthermore, it does not offend due
process. Additionally, it preserves judicial discretion by permit-
ting its district courts to determine what constitutes gross
negligence as opposed to simple negligence. Finally, it no lon-
ger would be the only required consideration concerning impos-
ing a litigation-ending sanction. The fact that district courts
would be required to consider the remaining three factors, and
articulate their determinations regarding the relevancy or
See supra Part I for a discussion regarding due process considerations and
imposing ultimate sanctions on parties.
See supra notes 182-184 and accompanying text.
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weight of every factor, eliminates the potential unfairness in
requiring only gross negligence to justify a default or dismiss-
al.
2. History of Abuse Including the Efficacy of Lesser
Sanctions
It is sensible to make it clear to every litigant that the
entire discovery record will be considered when fashioning an
appropriate sanction for a failure to comply with a discovery
order. Rule 37(b)(2) discusses possible sanctions for failure to
comply with a discovery order. But it mentions nowhere that a
litigant's prior record regarding discovery failures can or
should be taken into consideration. It is more than likely that
several courts in the Second Circuit already take a party's
history of abuse and the efficacy of lesser sanctions into consid-
eration prior to imposing a litigation-ending sanction. Howev-
er, the Second Circuit does not clearly require its court to en-
gage in such an analysis. It should require this analysis for
two major reasons: to protect litigants, and to provide district
courts with the flexibility to impose a severe sanction for the
failure to comply with even a single order.
Because dismissal, default and the like are such extreme
measures, the district court must be convinced that the given
sanction is warranted and necessary. In some situations, a
party's prior record may be an essential indicator of the party's
fault and whether a lesser sanction is appropriate under the
circumstances. A court should not be constrained in every case
to impose lesser sanctions prior to imposing a litigation-ending
sanction. However, if a lesser sanction will both correct the
deficiency and advance the general goals of sanction imposi-
tion, clearly it should be imposed rather than a dismissal or
default. The district or magistrate judge involved in parties'
discovery proceedings ought to be in a position to assess accu-
rately whether a lesser sanction is appropriate, and should be
required affirmatively to make that assessment in fairness to
the recusant party.
Making clear to litigants that the entire history of abuse
will be considered is also important for purposes of proper
notice. Admittedly, Rule 37 and cases which have already
affirmed harsh sanctions provide notice that failure to comply
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with a discovery order may result in harsh consequences. But
the current reality is that it is not wholly clear to litigants
what a court will consider prior to imposing a harsh sanction,
or what the litigants are entitled to in the way of warnings
and notice.' This factor should make it clear that actions
throughout the discovery process-not just failures to comply
with discovery orders, but other transgressions as well-will be
considered. If a party has any history of dilatoriness or delay,
even if not occasioned by failures to follow official court orders,
doubts should and can be resolved in favor of imposing a harsh
sanction.
The purpose of sanction imposition is to ensure that par-
ties respect the judicial process and judicial authority. Thus, if
a party has a history of contumaciousness with respect to these
issues, a harsh sanction is justified. The paternalism that is
present in much of the Second Circuit's case law in this area is
unnecessary. Like all court orders, discovery orders should be
complied with when issued, and sanctions for violating discov-
ery orders should not have to be preceded by explicit warnings
or the imposition of other, lesser sanctions.' To require oth-
erwise seems contrary to sanction imposition and Rule 37 in
general. Likewise, a district court should not feel bound to wait
until numerous orders have been ignored or disobeyed before
imposing a sanction on a party. It should have the freedom to
impose even the harshest sanction for one violation of a court
order if the circumstances warrant it. Permitting the district
court to consider the entire record bolsters its freedom in this
regard.
Thus, this requirement strikes a reasonable balance be-
tween putting litigants on notice of possible consequences and
See supra Parts IV, V regarding the Bcmbu case.
In Daval Steel Prods. v. MIV Fakredine, the Second Circuit affirmed an
order of sanctions and rejected the sanctioned party's argument that prior warn-
ings are required before imposing severe sanctions. 951 F.2d 1357, 1366 (2d Cir.
1991). The Second Circuit unequivocally stated, "Parties and counsel have no abso-
lute entitlement to be 'warned' that they disobey court orders at their peril." Id.
(emphasis added); see Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Noble Metals Intl,
Inc., 67 F.3d 766, 771 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that warning concerning possibility
of sanctions not necessary), cert. denied, 117 S. CL 64 (1996). But e supra notes
207-208, 233; Hathcock v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 53 F.3d 36, 40 (4th Cir.
1995) ([T]his circuit has emphasized the significance of warning a defendant about
the possibility of default before entering such a harsh sanction.").
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affording the district judge discretion in fashioning a sanction.
Courts should not be required to hold litigants' hands. But
litigants should not be unfairly disillusioned by the current
case law to think that warnings, deadlines and numerous fail-
ures are required before a case will be dismissed or default
judgment will be entered.
3. General Deterrence
General deterrence may not be a primary policy goal of
various other circuits, but it is a critical Second Circuit policy.
Thus, it makes sense to include it as a factor to be considered
prior to imposing a litigation-ending sanction."7 The differ-
ence between general and specific deterrence is critical to note
because only general deterrence ought to be included in the
Second Circuit's test.
Specific deterrence-ensuring compliance with an order by
the actual parties in the dispute at issue-is not technically
relevant when a court contemplates taking away a litigant's
suit altogether, because compliance at that stage in the process
is inconsequential."' Specific deterrence is more important
when assessing lesser sanctions. Litigants must respect the
process and must comply with orders in a timely fashion. The
deterrent effect a harsh sanction has on the particular litigants
in a case is not about compliance with the order in question in
the case. The goal is to ensure that the recusant party in the
case and all other litigants do not flout discovery obligations in
the future. If courts focus solely on the litigants in a particular
case, sanction imposition will not advance the goal of general
deterrence.
Unlike other circuits that require district courts to exam-
ine the amount of prejudice to the opposing party,5 9 the prej-
udice factor is not included in this proposed test because it
weakens the general deterrence goal and the Supreme Court's
... See supra Part II.B.3a regarding general deterrence as a unique factor
among the circuits with a test.
" See, e.g., New York Bay Co. v. State Bank of Patiala, No. 93 Civ. 6075,
1995 WL 567357, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 1995). The court cited Bambu for the
proposition that merely complying with an order does not protect a party from
sanctions. Other courts have intoned similar statements. Id. at *5.
'5 See supra Part II.B.2.
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clear message from National Hockey. While arguably impor-
tant, the focus on prejudice is not consistent with the purposes
behind sanctions: to punish the recalcitrant party, to be a
general deterrent and to ensure judicial efficiency. Technically,
it should not make a difference whether the recalcitrant
party's misconduct has seriously prejudiced the opposing party.
The point is that willful failure to comply with discovery orders
is intolerable. Thus, including a prejudice factor might actually
serve to encourage contumacious conduct. It tells a party that
refusing to comply with perhaps less consequential orders is
more acceptable than refusal to comply with other types of
orders. Parties should comply with every valid order. General
deterrence against noncompliance can only be effective if
courts require compliance with every order regardless of conse-
quence. Thus, the proposed test for the Second Circuit does not
include a prejudice factor.
4. Attorney Versus Client Misconduct
The Second Circuit should require its district courts to
consider whether a discovery failure is occasioned by the attor-
ney or client, as well as the client's awareness of the failure
when determining the propriety of imposing a litigation-ending
sanction. In spite of the unequivocal message in Link v. Waba-
sh Railroad Co."60 that a party selects counsel at its own per-
il, some circuits have refused to apply this rule in the context
of imposing litigation-ending sanctions."' This refusal is
based on the conclusion that it is unfair for an innocent client
to be deprived of an opportunity to litigate a case on its merits
through no fault of his or her own.' In order to preserve
- 370 U.S. 626 (1962). In Link, a sharply divided Court held:
There is certainly no merit to the contention that dismissal of petitioner's
claim because of his counsel's unexcused conduct imposes an unjust pen-
alty on the client. [The client] voluntarily chose this attorney as his rep-
resentative in the action, and he cannot now avoid the consequences of
the acts or omissions of this freely selected agent.
Id. at 633-34.
381 See supra notes 90-91 discussing the Eighth Circuit; supra Part ILB.3.d.
'= See supra note 146 for a representative sample of articles and commentaries
criticizing the Link rule. The District of Columbia Circuit has enunciated three
basic justifications for dismissing an action because of counsel's misconduct: (1)
dismissal is necessary because the opposing party has been so prejudiced that it
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general deterrence and maximize fairness, the Second Circuit
should follow suit, despite the fact that this goes against its
current policy. 6'
It is important when imposing sanctions to ensure that the
proper individuals are being sanctioned or deterred."' Impos-
ing a litigation-ending sanction on a faultless client does not
advance general deterrence fairly. Attorneys should not be
deterred from discovery abuse at the expense of their innocent
clients. It is therefore suggested that prior to levying the
harshest sanction available against a client, a court should
ensure that the client was either aware of or an active partici-
pant in the conduct warranting the severe sanction. In addi-
tion, a court should consider whether it would be more useful
to punish the attorney in question rather than his or her cli-
ent."e One warning or notification is all that is necessary.
Once a court is satisfied that the client has notice that his or
her attorney's actions will be held against him or her, the
client will not later be heard to complain of any ignorance or
would be unfair to require her to proceed; (2) dismissal is appropriate where re-
sort to any lesser sanction would not mitigate the severe burden that the miscon-
duct has placed on the judicial system; or (3) dismissal may serve as an ultimate
sanction, aimed at punishing abuses of the system and deterring future miscon-
duct. Shea v. Donohoe Constr. Co., 795 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
" The Second Circuit did not consider attorney versus client misconduct in the
Bambu case. It clearly appears from the record that defendant Gratch was not
responsible for the failure to comply with the order or the prior transgressions
identified by the magistrate judge in her report and recommendation. In
defendant's moving brief before the Second Circuit, it was stated that "Mr. Gratch
[client] was unaware of the Magistrate's ruling [discovery order dated August 30,
19911 because he suffered a heart attack." Brief for Defendants at 9. As already
discussed supra Part IV.A, it was defendant's counsel who improperly instructed
the client not to answer deposition questions based on relevance and who failed to
attend a settlement conference as clearly ordered by the magistrate judge. This
should have been considered by the district court and by the Second Circuit.
3" Shea, 795 F.2d at 1077.
" See, e.g., David W. Pollack, Sanctions Imposed by Courts on Attorneys Who
Abuse the Judicial Process, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 619, 640 (arguing that greater use
of sanctions against attorneys could provide an effective deterrent); Robert E.
Sarazen, An Ethical Approach to Discovery Abuse, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 459,
459 (1990) ("A lawyer abuses the discovery process because his personal ethics,
coupled with a lack of effective, meaningful deterrent, allow him to continually
abuse the process.") (emphasis added). But see Nicholas B. Katzenbach, Modern
Discovery: Remarks from the Defense Bar, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 732, 732 (1983)
(arguing that even though sanctioning attorneys may have some impact on curbing
discovery abuse, it is doubtful that the sanctions are a solution to discovery prob-
lems).
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unfairness. Numerous commentators support this proposal.'
Although it runs contrary to current views in the Second Cir-
cuit, this is an essential factor that all courts should consider
prior to depriving a litigant of the chance to defend a case on
its merits.
C. Proposal Summary and Application to Bambu
Requiring willfulness or fault, examining the history of a
party's abuse, and determining the general deterrent effect of a
sanction all comport with the Second Circuit's current philoso-
phy regarding discovery sanctions. Assessing whether the
abuse is occasioned by the attorney rather than an unknowing
client represents a departure from current thinking in the
circuit. In its totality, however, the proposed test advances the
Second Circuit's policies regarding litigation-ending sanction
imposition and ameliorates the deficiencies in the circuit's cur-
rent approach. An application of this test to the Bambu case
demonstrates this point.
The result in Bambu seems wrong for a number of reasons
discussed in Parts IV and V of this Note. A different result
might have occurred if the proposed test were applied. First, it
is clear that the requisite willfulness or fault existed. The de-
fendants in Bambu failed to comply with the discovery order at
issue amounting to "fault" as defined by the Second Cir-
cuit." The second factor could weigh either in favor of or
against the defendants. Considering the defense attorney's
directions to his client during depositions," his failure to ap-
pear for a conference,9 and the failure to comply with the
" See, eg., Susan Marie Lapenta, Note, Inryoc Inc. v. Metropolitan Engrg Co.:
Inexcusable Neglect by Whom?, 45 U. Prrr. L. REV. 695, 696 (1984) (arguing that
providing notice of attorney's negligence to client and sanctioning the attorney
before entering a default judgment would 'take the sting out of cases involving
gross attorney neglect.").
Even though the failure to comply was not deliberate, it can hardly be ques-
tioned that ignoring the court order merely because defendants' attorney could not
reach his client was grossly negligent. Defendants' attorney could have and should
have notified both the opposing party and the magistrate judge of the purported
illness.
" See supra notes 246-248 and accompanying text regarding defendants' failure
to answer questions during depositions based on relevance.
" See supra note 261 and accompanying text regarding Dunne's failure to
attend a conference.
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discovery order in a timely fashion,37 ° it is entirely plausible
to conclude that lesser sanctions would not be efficacious. On
the other hand, one might be inclined to consider the fact that
both parties appeared to be less than forthcoming with discov-
ery information. Accepting the magistrate judge's findings, it
can be assumed that the second factor also weighs against the
defendants.
Unfortunately, as the records stands, general deterrence
was not advanced in the Bambu case.37' However, this Note
suggests that this is partly attributable to the Second Circuit's
mixed messages to litigants regarding litigation-ending sanc-
tions-its tough stand but nurturing approach with respect to
such issues as warnings and setting specific deadlines.7 2 In
addition, the Second Circuit undermined general deterrence in
Bambu by likening the sanctioning process to a game of
chance, a roll of the dice.7 Assuming the proposed test had
been in place when Bambu was decided, general deterrence
would have been advanced because questions regarding warn-
ings and specific deadlines would not have been at issue.
The attorney-client consideration in Bambu weighs heavily
in favor of imposing a less harsh sanction. That is, the miscon-
duct that did, or would, justify a default in the case seems to
be entirely that of defendants' attorney. He directed defendant
Gratch not to respond to questions during his deposition based
on relevance. He failed, without any reason, to appear for a
scheduled conference. Finally, he failed to notify the opponents
or the court of Gratch's purported inability to comply with the
discovery order in question. However, it is important to note
that it is not entirely clear whether Gratch was aware of, or
actively participated in, the misconduct of his attorney as the
magistrate judge, district judge and circuit court were not
concerned with such an inquiry. In her report and recommen-
dation, however, the magistrate judge acknowledged that
defendants' attorney was mostly to blame for what she deemed
to be contumacious conduct warranting a default. 74 There-
' See supra Part IVA complete discussion of events leading up to default
judgment in the Bambu case.
... See supra notes 332-335 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 207-208, 233.
Bambu Sales, Inc. v. Ozak Trading Inc., 58 F.3d 849, 853 (2d Cir. 1995).
See supra Part V.C.1 and accompanying notes.
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fore, absent proof that Gratch was specifically notified or
warned concerning the unacceptable behavior, a default judg-
ment would not have been appropriate.
Application of the proposed test demonstrates the reasons
Bambu appears to have been wrongly decided and that its
result would likely be different under the proposed test. More
importantly, however, it also demonstrates that if a few key
facts were different, a default judgment would have seemed
perfectly appropriate without the sense that any injustice or
unfairness occurred. It is for this reason that the proposed test,
or something resembling it, is desirable.
The proposed test effectively balances the competing inter-
ests at play when a district court must decide whether to dis-
miss a case against one party based on a procedural failure
rather than on the merits of the case. Judicial discretion is
preserved by allowing the district courts to weigh and analyze
the competing factors as they see fit. Certainty, consistency
and a greater sense of fairness to litigants are also maintained
by requiring that each factor be considered and weighed, and
by requiring district courts to specify their determinations and
findings. It is, therefore, a fitting approach for the Second
Circuit to adopt.
CONCLUSION
Entering default judgment against a party for failure to
comply with a discovery order is both contemplated and autho-
rized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Second
Circuit is committed to making certain that litigants coming
before its judges follow discovery orders and do not abuse the
discovery process. Nonetheless, depriving a litigant of the op-
portunity to defend a case on its merits is an extreme response
to noncompliance with a discovery orderY In order to maxi-
mize fairness, consistency and certainty, a systematic approach
to determining the propriety of imposing a litigation-ending
sanction is expedient. The result in the Bambu case highlights
The Fifth Circuit characterized the levying of a harsh sanction as involving
a "question of life or death, or to be or not to be .... We are thus loathe to
approve of the dismissal of a case as a sanction ... without evidence of the ma-
leficent conduct that justifies death.' FDIC v. Conner, 20 F.3d 1376, 1381, 1383
(5th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added).
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the reasons why the Second Circuit would benefit from requir-
ing its district courts to consider a fixed set of factors prior to
imposing a litigation-ending sanction on a party under Rule
37(b)(2).
What remains to be decided is whether all the circuits
should be required to follow the same test regarding litigation-
ending sanctions, and whether Rule 37 should be amended to
include this standard test. As criticism regarding discovery
abuse mountsy16 and courts increasingly employ severe sanc-
tions to curb the abuse, the critical role Rule 37 will play in
federal courts cannot be overstated. Perhaps it is time to re-
consider the lack of specificity and guidance in Rule 37(b)(2)
with respect to litigation-ending sanctions, and conform it to
the process and approach already employed by a majority of
circuits.
Jodi Golinsky'
"78 One need only look at the cover of the November 1995 issue of the Ameri-
can Bar Association Journal to see how discovery is being viewed by the bench
and bar. The cover states in large, bold, black letters, "HARDBALL DISCOVERY:
There are no rules anymore. .. ." A.BA J., Nov. 1995.
* The author would like to thank Professor Jennifer L. Rosato, Michelle
Cucuzza and Benjamin Kessler for their invaluable assistance with earlier drafts.
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